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I. Parallel Proceedings - Sisyphean Progress
LouISE ELLEN TEITZ**
The primary reason for giving effect to the rulings of foreign tribunals is that such recognition
factors [sic] international cooperation and encourages reciprocity. Thus, comity promotes pre-
dictability and stability in legal expectations, two critical components of successful international
commercial enterprises. It also encourages the rule of law, which is especially important because
as trade expands across international borders, the necessity for cooperation among nations
increases as well.'
Like Sisyphus' never-ending labors of rolling the stone up the mountain only to have it
roll back again, many of the parallel proceedings this year were reversals, continuations, or
transmogrifications of last year's cases. For example, the Seventh Circuit reversed the ab-
stention of a lower court in favor of Greek proceedings,2 exalting the sacred virtues of
forum selection clauses. Meanwhile the House of Lords ultimately refused to enforce ex-
clusive jurisdiction clauses in the final level of the Donohue v. Armcol litigation, yielding to
the need for unitary order amidst multiple forums. Then, the Yahoo! litigation crossed the
Atlantic, 4 intensifying the underlying controversy about prescriptive jurisdiction in cyber-
space and serving as a reminder of the lack of shared values about free speech and expression.
The cases come in pairs-up the mountain of comity in Armco, down in AAR; deference
in Deutz,5 injunction in Younis.6 The underlying causes of parallel proceedings remain much
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1. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. See infra at text accompanying notes 33-41. For a discussion of the lower court opinion last year, see
Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings: Moving Into Cyberspace, 35 INT'L LAw. 491, 494-95 (2001).
3. See infra at text accompanying notes 23-32. For a fuller discussion of the opinion of the lower courts on
both sides of the Atlantic, see Teitz, supra note 2, at 497-500.
4. See infra at text accompanying notes 7-21. For a fuller discussion of the earlier proceedings, see Teitz,
supra note 2, at 492-93.
5. Gen. Elec. Co., 270 F.3d at 160.
6. Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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the same-concurrent jurisdiction, forum shopping, inability to enforce foreign judg-
ments-and unfortunately, too many courts continue to labor in the international field using
only the tools of domestic doctrine.
A. PARALLEL LITIGATION AND CONCURRENT PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION
The Yahoo! case illustrates of the new wave of parallel litigation,' which reflects the un-
certain reach of prescriptive jurisdiction in cyberspace, and therefore has implications for
the limits of adjudicative jurisdiction. The reverse declaratory judgment suit in a California
federal court starkly pits French anti-Nazi speech regulation against U.S. First Amendment
protections. Although the underlying substantive issue has been addressed within the con-
text of enforcing foreign defamation judgments,' the addition of criminal sanctions9 and
the use of cyberspace raise new issues, including the ability to block access within the limits
of new technology. Indeed, the case has drawn increased attention in light of September
11 and the rush of countries cracking down on speech that is seen as hateful or terrorist.'0
The first suit was filed in Paris" by the Union of Jewish Students, and the International
League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA), seeking to enforce French laws"a that
forbid the sale of Nazi-related goods, in this case through Yahoo!'s U.S.-based portal. In
November 2000, the Paris court upheld its initial interim order that Yahoo! must comply
within three months or face fines of 100,000 French francs per day."
In response to the Paris suit, Yahoo! filed the second suit, in federal court in San Jose,
California, seeking a declaratory judgment that the French judgment is not enforceable in
the United States and that the French court lacked jurisdiction to control Yahoo!'s U.S.-
based Web site.' 4 The district court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, that the controversy was not mooted by Yahoo!'s voluntary removal of Nazi-
related items from its site, and that the possibility of enforcement was real.'" The district
7. See Gumick v. DowJones & Co., (2001) V.S. Ct. 305, available at www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/
2001/305.htm (last visited July 3, 2002).
8. See, e.g., Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995) (applying Maryland Uniform Foreign-
Money Judgments Recognition Act); Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515, 1994 WL
419847 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
See generally Louise Ellen Teitz, TRANsNATioNAL LITIGATIoN 271-73 (1996 & 1999 Supp.).
9. A French court has indicated that it will bring criminal actions against Yahoo! and its former president,
with an initial trial date set for May 7, 2002. The former president could be sentenced to up to five years in
prison and fined if found guilty.
10. See Carl S. Kaplan, New Economy: Bracing For A Flood Of Effirts To Control Speech Seen As Hateful Or
Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002.
II. League Against Racism and Antisemitism- LICRA and Yahoo! Inc., Interim Court Order, Tribunal de Grande
Instance de Paris (County Court of Paris), Nov. 20, 2000, No. RG: 00/05308 (2000), available atwww.cdt.org/
jurisdiction (last visited July 3, 2002). The initial injunction was issued on May 22, 2000.
12. French Penal Code, art. R.645-2.
13. See League Against Racism, supra note 11.
14. Since Yahoo! has no significant assets in France, any attempt to enforce the French fines would probably
require an action in the United States where Yahoo! has assets. The suit also sought an injunction to prevent
the French anti-semitism advocacy groups from trying to enforce the French judgment in the United States.
The complaint is available at www.cdt.org/jurisdiction (last visited July 3, 2002). The case is also discussed in
Mylene Mangalindan & Kevin Delaney, Yahoo! Ordered to Bar the French From Nazi Items, WALL ST. J., Nov.
21, 2000, at BI.
15. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
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court stressed that the purpose of the U.S. action was "to determine whether a United
States court may enforce the French order without running afoul of the First
Amendment.... [and a] United States court is best situated to determine the application
of the United States Constitution.' 16 Rejecting the defendants' request for abstention, the
district court granted summary judgment for Yahoo! and found that enforcing the judgment
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment. In so doing, it relied heavily on earlier
cases refusing to enforce British libel judgments. 7 The district court indicated that its
holding applied even if Yahoo! had the technological ability to block access as required by
the French court, and in passing, suggested that the First Amendment might trump any
treaty or convention in connection with speech that originated in the United States.'
While this round of the Yahoo! litigation may have run its course, the issues of who
regulates conduct in cyberspace and what happens in the realm of concurrent jurisdiction
are far from settled. For Yahoo!, the possibility remains of criminal action in France against
a former executive.' 9 For multinational corporations, while there may be no international
judgments convention in place as yet,20 the Yahoo! litigation is a harbinger of what is to
come, when the local laws conflict with U.S. values and policies. We are likely to see an
increasing number of lawsuits filed in foreign countries, charging violation of criminal laws
as well as civil ones and reactive reverse declaratory judgment actions in the home forum."
A significant part of the litigation will turn on who controls the cyberspace in which the
conduct is occurring. Jurisdiction-adjudicative and prescriptive-is but a straw man for
the fundamental differences in underlying substantive law and policies.
B. PARALLEL LITIGATION AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Recently, an increasing number of cases of multiple proceedings have involved parties
seeking to enforce or avoid forum selection clauses.22 Many of the cases raise questions of
interpretation and scope of the clauses, especially in connection with multiple parties who
may not be part of the underlying contractual transaction. Chosen courts may be asked to
restrain parties from continuing other proceedings; non-designated courts may be asked to
stay actions in deference to the designated forum. The trouble arises when the two courts
involved disagree over the interpretation or scope of the forum selection clause, as seen in
the litigation on both sides of the Atlantic in the Armco cases23 discussed in last year's Year-
16. Id. at 1191-92.
17. Id.
18. "Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with respect to speech on the Internet and
an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech originating within the
United States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First Amendment."
Id. at 1193 (footnote omitted).
19. Seesupra note 9.
20. See generally Teitz, supra note 2, at 502, and infra at text accompanying notes 70-71.
21. For a discussion of some of these recent trends, see Eugene Gulland, All The World's A Forum, NAT'L
LJ., Feb. 11, 2002, at B 13. One recent case involved a RICO action brought by Canada against several cigarette
manufacturers in the United States to recover costs incurred as a result of an alleged conspiracy to smuggle
cigarettes into Canada. See Att'y Gen. of Canada v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc, 268 F.3d 103 (2d
Cir. 2001) (dismissed because revenue rule that courts of one sovereign will not enforce tax judgments or claims
of another sovereign).
22. See Teitz, supra note 2, at 497-500.
23. The U.S. proceeding is Armco Inc. v. N. Atlantic Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 1999). The
English proceedings are under the name Donohue v. Armco Inc. and Others. The lower court opinion is
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in-Review. However, the last chapter of this litigation in 2001, a decision by the House of
Lords,24 illustrates the statesmanlike use of comity to defuse escalating proceedings, while
providing some protection for the English defendant in the New York forum.
The Armco cases arise out of a management buy-out headed by Mr. Donohue and Mr.
Atkins of a group of English insurance companies owned by Armco and some of its sub-
sidiaries. The Armco negotiators were Mr. Rossi and Mr. Stinson. Armco brought suit
against Donohue, Rossi, Stinson, and Atkins-a.k.a. "the group of four"-and additional
corporate conspirators in the Southern District of New York alleging common law fraud,
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and RICO violations. Some of the defendants filed
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, andforunm non conven-
iens. The defendants specifically argued that filing suit in the United States breached the
English exclusive jurisdiction clauses contained in the transfer and sale agreements."
In the subsequent English proceedings, Donohue sought to enjoin the U.S. litigation as
vexatious and oppressive, evidenced by its being in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction
clauses. The English trial court found that exclusive jurisdiction clauses, although valid,
only bound some of the parties and that the claims in the New York lawsuit were based on
a pre-existing conspiracy and therefore did not arise out of the contracts and were largely
outside the exclusive jurisdiction clauses.16 The English court also found that the proceed-
ings against Donohue in New York were neither vexatious nor oppressive and England was
not the "natural forum" for the litigation. The defendants appealed.
Subsequently, the New York district court denied the motions to dismiss, agreeing with
plaintiffs that the forum selection clauses did not cover the pending litigation and were
unenforceable because induced by fraud. In denying the forum non conveniens motion, the
district court relied specifically on the intervening English trial court opinion to demon-
strate that the United States had a greater interest in the action.27
Next, however, the proceedings returned to England, before the Court of Appeal, which
reversed the lower trial court and issued an antisuit injunction against the Armco entities
from proceeding in New York." In addition to Donohue, the court granted injunctions to
two other individuals and four corporations, even though all but one were not parties to
any exclusive jurisdiction clause. They were considered necessary and proper parties for
the English proceedings.9 Contrary to the lower court's approach of looking at the most
appropriate place for the litigation, the Court of Appeals considered that when there is an
exclusive jurisdiction clause there has to be a strong reason for not granting an antisuit
injunction to enforce the contractual agreement.
In the final act of this litigation, at least for this year, the House of Lords has reversed
the Court of Appeal.'0 The Lords first reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeal to
include in the antisuit injunction individuals and corporations that had not been party to
reported at: 2 Lloyd's Rep. 649 (Q.B. 1999) (Aikens, J., dismissing application for antisuit). The Court of
Appeal decision is reported at I Lloyd's Rep. 579 (C.A. 2000) (granting antisuit injunctions).
24. Donohue v. Armco Inc., U.K.H.L. 64 (H.L. 2001).
25. Not all of the Armco entities, nor all of the defendants, were parties to the agreements at issue. See
Donahue, U.K.H.L. 7.
26. See Donahue, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 649.
27. Armco Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
28. See Donahue, I Lloyd's Rep. at 579.
29. See Donahue, U.K.H.L. 64, J 15.
30. Id.
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the exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The Lords clarified the principles controlling the grant
of an injunction as established in other case law. First, an injunction is only available when
justice requires and will only restrain vexatious or oppressive foreign litigation. Second, the
foreign forum must not be the natural home for the litigation. Third, the court must also
evaluate what injustices may result for both parties, including whether the defendant will
be deprived of advantages in the foreign forum to which he is entitled. Applying these
principles, the House of Lords found that England was not the natural forum for the
proceedings, and as to these defendants, the New York litigation is neither vexatious nor
oppressive.31
The House of Lords then addressed the grant of the antisuit injunction as to Donohue
alone, considering that "where parties have bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction
clause effect should ordinarily be given to that obligation in the absence of strong reasons
for departing from it."32 The House of Lords found that Donohue had the right, as to the
Armco entities with whom he had exclusive jurisdiction clauses, to expect not to be sued in
New York and even more critically, not to be subject to RICO claims that would be im-
possible in England. However, the Lords noted that those Armco entities not bound by the
exclusive jurisdiction clauses may pursue Donohue where he can be found, and the Armco
entities bound by the clauses may pursue him on claims outside the exclusive jurisdiction
clauses-all of which appear to have found jurisdiction in New York and will proceed even
if an antisuit injunction were issued. This prospect of litigation proceeding both in England
and New York led the House of Lords to deny the injunction, concluding that,
the interests of justice are best served by the submission of the whole dispute to a single tribunal
which is best fitted to make a reliable, comprehensive judgment on all matters in issue. A
procedure which permitted the possibility of different conclusions by different tribunals, per-
haps made on different evidence, would in my view run directly counter to the interests of
justice."
However, the House of Lords added a condition that Mr. Donohue may not be sued for
RICO claims or multiple or punitive damages, and that Mr. Donohue may claim that the
sale and purchase agreement is governed by English law. Thus the House of Lords allowed
the goal of "submission of the whole dispute to a single tribunal" for a comprehensive
judgment in the interests of justice to override enforcement of an exclusive jurisdiction
clause. The result encourages courts to avoid granting antisuit injunctions, which will sim-
ply result in encouraging conflicting judgments, but which also counsels courts to attempt
to shape some compromise where possible to protect the contractual expectations of parties.
In contrast to the ultimately measured approach of the House of Lords in the Armco
litigation, the Seventh Circuit again has demonstrated its resistence to comity, 4 by reversing
the lower court's abstention order in AAR International, Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A.-this
time in the name of enforcing a "permissive forum selection clause."" The lower court had
31. In addition, the House of Lords considered a jurisdictional objection, deciding that "[i]t would be wrong
in principle to allow [the non-parties to the clauses] to use Mr. Donohue's action as a Trojan horse in which




34. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993); see generally Teitz,
supra note 8, at 245-47.
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granted a motion to abstain in favor of proceedings in Greece concerning the lease of an
airplane.16 Following the Colorado River 7 and Moses Cone'" domestic precedents of abstention
"for wise judicial administration," the lower court considered a number of factors but relied
heavily on the repetitive nature of the actions and the satisfactory alternative forum in
Greece. 9
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit, like the lower court, turned first to domestic pre-
cedent. The court first disagreed with the lower court determinations that the U.S. and
Greek actions were parallel and that the Greek actions would likely dispose of the claims
in the U.S. action. The Circuit found that the Greek actions focused on the alleged engine
failure, rather than on the independent duties of the defendants to make payments under
the lease, which were the subject of the U.S. action. Reading the requirement of Moses Cone
to mean it would be a "serious abuse of discretion" to abstain if there is any doubt as to the
actions being parallel, the Seventh Circuit found a basis to reverse. The court rejected an
argument equating "parallel" for purposes of Moses Cone with pleadable as a compulsory
counterclaim, focusing on whether Greece has a compulsory counterclaim rule.
All of this posturing was irrelevant in the end since the appellate court decided that the
lower court had improperly balanced the abstention factors. The Seventh Circuit found
that the district court had placed "undue weight on the inconvenience of the federal forum
for the [Greek] appellees, and did not adequately consider the inconvenience of the Greek
forum for AAR." 40 The district court did not consider the non-exclusive Illinois jurisdiction
clause and the irrevocable waiver of objection to Illinois as an inconvenient forum contained
in the lease, and thus there was a basis for reversal under the abuse of discretion standard.
This jurisdiction and waiver clause also weighed in the Seventh Circuit's decision to refuse
to abstain in the face of parallel litigation, such that AAR ultimately appears to have received
from this non-exclusive clause the benefits that would otherwise be accorded only to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause.
In the second portion of the opinion, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the consent
to non-exclusive jurisdiction and waiver of objection was also dispositive of the foreign
defendant's forum non conveniens motion. The court again equated the permissive jurisdic-
tion clause and waiver of venue with a mandatory forum selection clause and applied the
Bremen4l standards of presumptive validity in the absence of a showing that (1) the clause
was the result of fraud, (2) its enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or (3) it would
be so inconvenient as to deprive one of his day in court.42 In the end, the court denied the
motion for forum non conveniens with an analysis that again gave determinative weight to
the non-exclusive choice of forum clause and short shrift to the fact of earlier-filed foreign
litigation and existing rulings by the Greek court.
35. AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A., 100 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2000), rev'd, AAR Int'l, Inc.
v. Nimelias Enters S.A., 250 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2001).
36. For a fuller discussion of the lower court decision, see Teitz, supra note 2, at 494-95.
37. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, A Branch Too Far. Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo. L. REv. 99 (1986). See also Teitz, supra
note 8, at 238-40.
38. Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
39. AAR Int'l, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
40. AAR Int'l, Inc., 250 F.3d at 522.
41. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
42. AAR Int'l, Inc., 250 F.3d. at 525. Here the Seventh Circuit relied on its earlier precedent concerning the
validity of a forum selection clause in Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Cases like Armco and AAR that result from differences in the interpretation and enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses serve to highlight the need for a multilateral convention
that will enforce forum selection clauses much the way the New York Convention assures
that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable. Even when parties attempt to pre-ordain the
location of later disputes in transnational transactions, the inability to enforce that agree-
ment without litigation nullifies the value of a choice of forum clause and removes the
predictability and allocation of costs for which the parties bargained. A scaled-back Hague
Judgments Convention43 that gave credibility and certainty to choice of court clauses, by
means of subsequent enforcement of judgments, would go a long way in resolving a sig-
nificant number of parallel proceedings, and ones that have engendered increasingly vocal
reactions even among similar legal systems.
C. ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS IN 2001
Antisuit injunctions, the reverse image of staying or dismissing, accord no deference to
foreign sovereigns. The Circuits have generally split into two camps,- those that embrace
the liberal approach to granting an antisuit injunction, followed primarily by the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, and those circuits that have adopted the stricter "Laker"
41
standard, followed primarily by the D.C., Second, and Sixth Circuits. In 2001, the Laker
approach gained a majority when the Third Circuit officially aligned itself with the "more
restrictive standard," after hinting at the importance of comity within the transnational
litigation context in several earlier cases.- In General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG,47 the Third
Circuit reversed the district court's order enjoining the defendant's efforts in English courts
to enforce the right to arbitration on the basis of comity, and in the process rejected the
argument that an important public policy-"the sanctity of the jury verdict"-would be
threatened without the injunction.
In Deutz, GE entered into a joint venture contract with Moteren-Werke Mannheim AG,
a German corporation, to design and manufacture diesel engines for locomotives. Under
the contract, Moteren-Werke's parent, Deutz AG, guaranteed the design obligations of the
subsidiary. When the joint venture fell apart and Deutz refused to provide additional fund-
ing, GE brought suit in federal court in Pennsylvania for breach of contract. Deutz, besides
challenging personal jurisdiction, also asserted that the contract required arbitration. In
July 1999, while the suit was pending in the district court, Deutz sought to arbitrate before
the International Arbitration Association in London. The district court, meanwhile, ruled
that there was personal jurisdiction and submitted to a jury the issue of whether the contract
language provided for arbitration. The jury found that Deutz was not entitled to arbitration.
In April 2000, before the arbitration panel issued a decision, Deutz petitioned the High
43. See infra at text accompanying notes 70-71.
44. For an interesting analysis of parallel proceedings, circuit by circuit, see Margarita Trevino de Coale,
Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States,
17 B.U. ITr'L LJ. 79 (1999). See generally Teitz, supra note 8, at 233-50.
45. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
46. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying comity
in connection with prescriptive jurisdiction in antitrust case); Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co.,
651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Sommer Allibert, S.A., No. Civ. 97-3914, 1998
VVL 195938 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1998).
47. General Electric Co. v. Deutz Ag., 270 F.3d at 159.
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Court in London to enjoin GE from continuing to litigate in federal court in Pennsylvania,
which the English court declined to do. At the end of July 2000, after the London court
had refused to enjoin GE and before the arbitral panel's decision, GE convinced the U.S.
district court to do what the London court had refused to do - issue an antisuit injunction,
and enjoin Deutz from resorting to the High Court in the future. Deutz appealed. In
November 2000, the arbitration panel held that GE and Deutz had not agreed to arbitrate
this dispute, closing the circle.
The Third Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction and the determination that Deutz was
not entitled to compel arbitration under the contract, but reversed the antisuit injunction,
thus clearly joining with those Circuits following the stricter Laker approach to granting
antisuit injunctions. Although the district court arguably had applied the stricter standard,
the Third Circuit did not agree that the court's jurisdiction was threatened by the possibility
that the arbitral panel might find that the parties had agreed to arbitrate. The court found
that "the circumstances here were not so aggravated as to justify interference with the
jurisdiction of the courts of another sovereign state, and there is no indication that the
English courts would have prevented General Electric from arguing the res judicata
effect . . ." of the district court order.4s In addition, the English High Court had already
refused to issue an injunction against GE and given no indication that it was likely to issue
one. Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the public policy of the forum,
as represented by a jury verdict, was threatened by the parallel litigation.49
Of particular significance in Deutz is the Third Circuit's repeated acknowledgement that
parallel litigation involving international proceedings is different from purely domestic lit-
igation, and thus the precedent should reflect different values, particularly comity. The
court looked at its own international cases and took great pains to show deference to the
English High Court's ruling1s Moreover, the Third Circuit's unwillingness to consider
the effect of jury findings as an essential public policy of the forum is an acknowledgment
that not all litigation will, or need, follow the American model.
It is interesting to compare the Deutz court's stand on the public policy of jury trials with
Younis Brothers & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co.," an opinion issued just six months earlier
by a district court in the Third Circuit. In Younis, the district court granted an antisuit
injunction in connection with parallel litigation in Liberia, basically because of the Liberian
court's refusal to accord resjudicata effect to an earlier U.S. federal court ruling. The insured
plaintiffs had sued CIGNA in federal court to recover for property losses suffered in Liberia
during the Liberian civil war in 1990. The jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was set
aside by the court, primarily on the basis that, as a matter of law, recovery was precluded
under the war risk exclusion in the policy. The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit again against
48. Id. at 159.
49. Although the jury unquestionably has a more important role in the American jurisprudential system
than in that in any other nation, its verdict is neither infallible nor immune from judicial scrutiny.
We have been cited to no authority that endorses enjoining proceedings in a foreign court on the grounds
that an American jury verdict might be called into question.
Id.
50. Id. at 161-62 ("Our jurisprudence thus reflects a serious concern for comity .... This is not an aggravated
case that calls for extraordinary intervention, nor is it sufficient that the ruling of the arbitral panel might have
jeopardized the district court's jurisdiction.").
51. Younis Brothers & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
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CIGNA in Liberia. The Liberian court rejected CIGNA's defense of res judicata on the
basis of the earlier U.S. federal court judgment, relying on Liberia's policy against judgment
n.o.v., as evidenced by its express abolition of this practice. CIGNA filed suit in U.S. federal
court to enjoin the plaintiffs from continuing to litigate in Liberia or seeking to enforce
the Liberian judgment. In granting the antisuit injunction, the district court acknowledged
that the Third Circuit had "implicitly" adopted the restrictive approach, but applied a
"balancing test" and relied heavily on its finding that the Liberian litigation "is wholly
duplicative" and vexatious, as well as the Liberian's court refusal to recognize the earlier
U.S. judgment as a threat to the U.S. court's jurisdiction.52 The district court also relied
on "our nation's strong public policy in favor of resjudicata and the finality of judgments."53
The court ultimately decided that the plaintiffs would suffer no legal harm "since it has
already been determined that they are not entitled to recover against CIGNA, and because
of the strong public policy in favor of res judicata.. .- 4 The Younis case is a graphic example
of the result due to the lack of a multilateral treaty on recognition and enforcement of
judgments.55 Unfortunately, it is also another example of the transposing of domestically
developed theories, such as preclusion, into an international context.
In yet another of the cases discussed last year,56 the Second Circuit has reversed and
remanded the granting of an antisuit injunction in an admiralty case involving about 1000
claimants in a limitation proceeding. The district court had enjoined a third party defen-
dant's parallel suit in Korea for a declaratory judgment of nonliability, which named only
three of the cargo claimants as parties. In reversing the district court, primarily due to
uncertainty about aspects of personal jurisdiction over the third party defendant, the Second
Circuit, without reaching the merits of the injunction, stressed again its strict approach to
antisuit injunctions and its emphasis on two factors: "whether the foreign action threatens
the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and whether strong public policies of the enjoining
forum are threatened by the foreign action .... ,,sT The Second Circuit, in dicta, intimated
that the district court should have given greater weight to these two factors than to whether
"proceedings in the other forum prejudice other equitable considerations" or whether "ad-
judication of the same issues in separate actions would result in delay, inconvenience, ex-
pense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment." 8 Thus, the Second Circuit stands firm in its
commitment to restraint in the face of parallel proceedings.
52. Id. at 746.
53. Id. at 747. The district court quoted extensively from the Supreme Court's opinion in Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981), for finding that res judicata "is a rule of fundamental and
substantial justice, of public policy and of private peace, which should be cordially regarded and enforced by
the courts." Moitie concerned litigation in state and federal courts only and had no international component.
54. Younis Bros., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
55. It is not clear whether a treaty with a public policy exception to recognition might still provide a court
a basis to refuse to recognize a judgment under these facts.
56. In re Rationis Enters., No. 97 CV 9052 (RO), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10226 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2000),
rev'd, 261 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2001). See Teitz, supra note 2, at 500.
57. In re Rationis Enters., 261 F.3d at 270, citing China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. MV. Choong Yong, 837
F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987)).
58. Id. at 270. In granting the antisuit injunction, the district court had stressed the "unusual size and
complexity" of the limitation proceeding and the concern with potential collateral estoppel effects from any
Korean judgment.
SUMMER 2002
432 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
D. MIXED RESULTS
A recent case from the District of Massachusetts, Linkco, Inc. v. Nichimen Corp.," nicely
illustrates deference to a foreign forum, in this case viewed within the context of a motion
to dismiss the U.S. litigation forforum non conveniens where reverse litigation had already
resulted in a foreign judgment.6° Nichimen, a Japanese-based corporation, filed the first
suit-a declaratory judgment action in Japan-which was contested on the merits by
Linkco, the defendant Delaware company. The Japanese court issued a twenty-one-page
opinion, finding for Nichimen on all counts, including those based on U.S. federal eco-
nomic espionage laws and Massachusetts unfair business practices law. Linkco subsequently
filed suit in federal court in Illinois. When Nichimen moved to dismiss for forum non
conveniens,6' Linkco dismissed the Illinois action and simultaneously filed a nearly identical
complaint in Massachusetts federal court-which, not surprisingly, was met by the same
motions to dismiss as had been filed in Illinois. As part of its analysis of the forum non
conveniens motion, the court considered the impact of the earlier Japanese judgment and
the potential enforceability of any subsequent U.S. judgment abroad. The court suggested
that it might be barred from hearing Linkco's case by the res judicata effect of the earlier
Japanese judgment, and that Linkco would be unable to enforce any judgment the U.S.
federal court might render. Finally, the district court emphasized the importance of comity
where a foreign judgment has already been rendered, quoting Hilton v. Guyot and the classic
parallel litigation case, Laker.62
Finally, the Northern District of California recently proved that there is more than one
way both to "abstain" in favor of parallel litigation and to transpose wholly domestic doc-
trine to the international context.63 In Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A.,64 the
first suit was filed in France in December 1998 by a French buyer of computer parts, which
allegedly were defective and caught fire, seeking replacement costs and consequential dam-
ages. The California seller claimed in that action that the sales invoices and user's manual
limited recovery, such that the sole remedy was repair and replacement of malfunctioning
parts. More than one year later, while the French suit was proceeding before the French
Commercial Court, the California seller filed a reverse declaratory action in U.S. federal
59. Linco, Inc. v. Nichimen Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Mass. 2001).
60. It appears that the Japanese judgment was subject to appeal since the U.S. defendant in that litigation,
Linkco., had indicated it planned to appeal. The district court, however, also suggested that the judgment in
the Japanese case rendered moot the motion for a stay pending the Japanese litigation by Nichimen, the
defendant in the U.S. case and plaintiff in the reverse litigation in Japan, is moot.
61. The motion to dismiss forforum non conveniens was joined with an alternative motion to stay the litigation
in light of pending parallel litigation, a common practice.
62. The central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be
given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity,
thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of both
forums are advanced-the foreign court because its laws and policies have been vindicated; the domestic country
because international cooperation and ties have been strengthened. The rule of law is also encouraged, which
benefits all nations. Linkco, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (quoting Laker, 731 F.2d at 937).
63. For a discussion of the incorrect reliance on domestic precedent in an international context, see Posner
v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222-24 (11 th Cir. 1999), discussed in Louise Ellen Teitz, ParallelProceedings
and the Guiding Hand of Comity, 34 I,,r'L LAW. 545, 546-47 (2000).
64. Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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court, seeking a determination that the parts were not defective, or in the alternative that,
the sole remedy is repair or replacement. The California plaintiff (seller) sought summary
judgment while the French defendant (buyer) moved to stay or dismiss the U.S. litigation
in favor of the earlier-filed French suit. The district court first looked at international
abstention, and while admitting that "this case appear[s] to fit neatly with the doctrine,
65
decided that the Ninth Circuit has not specifically adopted "international abstention." In-
stead, the court utilized another discretionary doctrine, allowing courts to decline jurisdic-
tion of declaratory actions and permitting greater discretion than the Colorado River ab-
stention.66 Under the test for declining jurisdiction in actions seeking only declaratory relief
with no independent claims, the "touchstone factors" look to whether the court can avoid
duplicative litigation while considering the "convenience of the parties, and the availability
and relative convenience of other remedies."67 While the district court ultimately decided
that it should dismiss 6  the later-filed action in deference to the ongoing French proceeding,
its analysis tries to shoehorn international facts into the domestic doctrine with forum non
conveniens factors added in. Comity won in the end, but in the process the court further
fragmented the doctrinal treatment of multiple proceedings when non-domestic litigation
is involved.
E. PREDICTING THE PATH OF FUTURE PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
The amount of parallel litigation generated by issues of concurrent prescriptive jurisdic-
tion is likely to increase exponentially, especially in cyberspace and areas lacking consensus
on underlying substantive law and values. Areas such as defamation, intellectual property,
and securities law are ripe for friction among courts.69 The conflict is also likely to expand
in the future to parallel proceedings where one of the actions involves a criminal or penal
action.
Major news events in 2001 also suggest the potential for increased parallel proceedings.
Litigation stemming from September 11 is likely to generate actions in multiple forums,
both civil and criminal, and many of a class nature, especially where defendants seek to gain
universal preclusive results. Complicating such litigation may be specific tribunals or ad-
ministrative bodies established to handle portions of claims and federal statutes providing
relief. Another major event in the news, the Enron scandal, will likely end in parallel pro-
ceedings, some of which may involve bankruptcy actions of one or more entities and
produce actions in the United States and elsewhere where Enron has assets or business
partners.70
65. Id. at 1149.
66. Id. at 1150 (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995)).
67. Id. (quoting Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998)).
68. One aspect of trying to treat this as a discretionary dismissal under the declaratory judgment doctrine
is the decision to dismiss the action, here without prejudice, rather than staying the action, which is often the
course utilized in abstention cases.
69. For a recent typical example of the potential for parallel proceedings erupting, see Gumick, supra note
7, an Australian litigation brought against Dow Jones & Co. for alleged defamation based on an internet
publication. Dow Jones has appealed the decision and there has not been any enforcement action and as yet
no attempts to block enforcement through parallel litigation.
70. The question of deferring to parallel proceedings has arisen previously in connection with large multi-
national bankruptcies that involve assets and creditors in different nations. The Second Circuit, relying on
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The increasingly likely stalemate, for some of the reasons discussed last year at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law in producing a comprehensive jurisdiction and
judgments convention to which the United States would be a party suggests that parallel
litigation due to concurrent jurisdiction and the unenforceability of foreign judgments will
continue.7 Some country members of the Hague Conference have called for a scaled-back
convention that might provide limited relief while not addressing some of the controversial
areas involving consumers, electronic commerce, and intellectual property. The carefully
crafted compromise between the civil law tradition of lis pendens and the common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens may unfortunately fall by the wayside. One distinct pos-
sibility gaining attention focuses on a choice of court/forum convention"2 that would en-
force forum selection clauses and resulting judgments, much as the New York Convention
does with arbitration clauses and subsequent arbitral awards. Although only a small piece
of the puzzle of a judgments convention, a large portion of multiple proceedings is gen-
erated by actions in contravention of forum selection clauses or seeking to enforce forum
selection clauses. Reducing the friction generated from these cases would go a long way
toward reducing the number and need for parallel litigation and providing predictability in
planning transactions. Like Sisyphus' labors, the attempts to achieve a comprehensive judg-
ments convention may slide backwards before making further progress.
international comity, deferred to English proceedings in In re Maxwell Comm. Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir.
1996). The opposite result was reached in connection with parallel proceedings involving the United States
and Nevis, in connection with Rimsat, a corporation organized under the laws of Nevis butwith its headquarters
in the United States See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996). This past year there was parallel
litigation and antisuit injunctions in In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int'l Ins. Ltd., 272 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002).
71. The newest draft of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, an interim text, was drawn up at Part One of the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session, which was
held from June 6-22, 2001. The draft text, Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First
Part of the Diplomatic Conference, is available at the Hague Conference's Web site, www.hcch.net/e/workprog/
jdgm.html (last visited July 3, 2002). Two other documents on the Hague Conference Web site, both produced
by Avril D. Haines, provide insight into the problems facing the Conference, especially in connection with the
Internet and also the problems related to choice of court agreements. See Avril D. Haines, The Impact Of The
Internet On The Judgments Project: Thoughts For The Future, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Comm'n I, 19th Sess., Preliminary Document No. 17 (Feb. 2002), and Avril D. Haines, Choice Of Court
Agreements In International Litigation: Their Use And Legal Problems To Which They Give Rise In The Context Of
The Interim Text, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Comm'n 1, 19th Sess., Preliminary Doc-
ument No. 18 (Feb. 2002). Both available at www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html.
Since June 2001, there have been informal meetings among different member nations, exploring ways to
continue the work on the Judgments Convention. The United States held informal meetings with several of
its trading partners during fall 2001 in preparation for a meeting of Hague Conference members in April 2002
(Commission I, 19th Session) to determine how, or if, to proceed with the project. For a discussion of the state
of negotiations, see the document prepared by the Permanent Bureau, Some Reflections On The Present State Of
Negotiations On The Judgments Project In The Context Of The Future Work Programme Of The Conference, Prelim-
inary Document No. 16, available at www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html.
72. See Preliminary Document No. 18, supra note 71.
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II. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
DOUGLAS K. MULLEN*
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)75 is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities in a U.S. court.74 The FSIA
codifies the 'restrictive theory' of foreign sovereign immunity, which grants immunity to a
foreign sovereign unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies.7" In 2001, courts dis-
cussed retroactive application of the FSIA, the effect of tiered ownership interests, the
waiver of immunity exception, FSIA and Head of State Immunity, and service of process
requirements.
A. RETROACTIvE APPLICATION OF THE FSIA
In 1952, the United States indicated support for restrictive sovereign immunity by issuing
the Tate Letter. 6 This position was later codified by the passage of the FSIA in 1976."7
While the Circuits split on whether the FSIA can be applied retroactively,71 courts this year
followed a growing trend, applying the FSIA to current suits based on sovereign actions
prior to 1952. Three district court cases in 2001 addressed claims arising out of human
rights violations during World War II. In two, courts found that the FSIA applied retro-
actively (providing jurisdiction in one, barring it in the other), while in the third, the court
did not reach the issue of retroactivity.
In Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 9 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California applied the FSIA to a claim for original paintings by Gustav Klimt stolen by the
Nazis during WWII and in the possession of the Austrian government.8 0 Defendants argued
their entitlement to absolute immunity because the claim was based on events prior to
1952.1 Following a trend developing since the Supreme Court's decision in Landgrafre-
garding retroactive application of statutes,8 2 the court found jurisdiction under the expro-
*Douglas K. Mullen, Attorney Advisor, Office of General Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1989).
74. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
76. 26 Dep't St. Bull. 1982 at 984-85.
77. See Verlinden B.V.v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
78. See, e.g., Jackson v. Peoples Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply
the FSIA because it would be unfair to interfere with a foreign state's expectation of absolute immunity for
acts committed in 1911); Carl Marks & Co. v. U.S.S.R., 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating U.S.S.R.'s
absolute immunity cannot be abrogated for claims based on debt instruments issued in 1916); Slade v. United
States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.D.C. 1985); but see Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d
118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (permitting the retroactive application of a 1988 FSIA amendment because the
amendment was jurisdictional and did not affect substantive rights of the parties); Haven v. Rzeczpospolita
Polska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (permitting claims based on property expropriated during and
after WWII because FSIA is jurisdictional and does not affect substantive rights).
79. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Ca. 2001).
80. See id. at 1201.
81. See id. at 1199.
82. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (holding that if Congress has not expressly
stated a statute's reach, and application would not impair a party's rights, as in the case of a jurisdictional
statute, retroactive application is permitted); Haven, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (allowing FSIA claims arising out
of WWII events).
SUMMER 2002
436 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
priation exception of the FSIA, holding that as a jurisdictional statute, the FSIA does not
affect substantive rights but only changes the tribunal hearing the case and thus should be
applied retroactively."3
The FSIA is commonly understood to have narrowed the scope of sovereign immunity,8 4
and thus its retroactive application is generally sought, where relevant, by plaintiffs suing
sovereigns. However, presumably because it was clear no exceptions to immunity would
apply, Plaintiffs in Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins defer Francais"5 argued that the
FSIA did not apply retroactively to the VWI deportations of Jews by the French railroad
at issue in their case. Plaintiffs instead sought jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity
law as it existed prior to the enactment of the FSIA. In addressing the question of retro-
activity, the district court acknowledged the Second Circuit's 1988 decision in Carl Marks
barring retroactive applicationB6 relied on heavily by plaintiffs, but noted in dicta that
Landgraf might mean Carl Marks was no longer good law." In any event, the court found
no need to confront the status of Carl Marks directly, finding it inapposite to the unusual
posture of Abrams." Applying the FSIA, the district court dismissed the complaint because
none of the statutory exceptions to immunity applied and hence plaintiffs "failed to show
a basis for subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA." 9
In Hwang v. Japan,9 the D.C. District Court identified, but found it did not need to
decide, the question of whether the FSIA applies to pre-1952 events. Plaintiffs, so-called
"comfort women," brought a class action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated
women who alleged to have been victims of sexual slavery and torture by the Japanese
military before and during WWII. The court dismissed the complaint without deciding
whether the FSIA would apply retroactively, finding Japan to be immune from suit under
either an absolute or restrictive immunity test because none of the FSIA exceptions to
immunity applied.9 ' Thus, post-Landgraf, the courts of the D.C. Circuit have yet to address
expressly the question of whether the FSIA applies to pre-1952 events, although the Creigh-
ton decision, allowing retroactive application of an FSIA amendment, suggests how the
court may rule when the issue is presented squarely 2
B. TIERING OF OWNERSHIP INTERESTS
The FSIA applies to defendants that fall within the definition of a "foreign state" or an
"agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state.93 The Circuits are split on the question of
83. See Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
84. See Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 443-44 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
85. id.
86. Carl Marks, 841 F.2d at 27.
87. Abrams, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
88. Id. at 443-45.
89. Id. at 450.
90. Hwan GeumJoo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
91. See id. at 59-64 (finding the waiver and commercial activity exceptions to immunity do not apply in this
case). As the Hwang court noted, it was in much the same position as the D.C. Circuit in Princz, for because
none of the FSIA exceptions would apply, it was not necessary to "decide whether the FSIA applie[d] to pre-
1952 events in order to resolve this case." Id. at 58 (quoting Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166,
1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
92. Creigbton, 181 F.3d at 124.
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whether an indirect or tiered majority ownership of a corporation or subsidiary is sufficient
to qualify an entity as a foreign state under these definitions.
94
In Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., the Ninth Circuit continued to stand alone in prohibiting
tiering.95 Plaintiffs, banana workers from Central American states, filed a class action suit
against manufacturers of pesticides for exposure and injuries allegedly caused by pesticides
in their home countries. 96 In direct opposition to the Fifth Circuit's holding last year in
Delgado v. Shell Oily1 the Ninth Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction under the FSIA
over the very same two "Dead Sea Companies" that had been at issue in Delgado, which
were indirectly owned by the Israeli government during the time of the alleged conduct.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit approach, district courts in New York and Ohio all
permitted tiering in 2001, finding jurisdiction under the FSIA over companies owned in-
directly by foreign sovereigns. 9s
C. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Under the FSIA, a sovereign is not entitled to immunity where it has waived such im-
munity, either explicitly or implicitly.9 In 2001, courts continued to interpret this exception
narrowly. In Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany,-m Plaintiff sued Germany for his im-
prisonment in Nazi concentration camps during WWII, arguing that such violation of a
jus cogens norm constituted a waiver of any sovereign immunity and vested the court with
jurisdiction. 101 The Seventh Circuit, following precedent, refused to recognize ajus cogens
violation as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity, holding that the waiver exception
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). An "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state includes any separate legal
person that is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision "or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision and which is neither a citizen of the
United States nor created under the laws of a third country." Id.
94. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 176 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding tiering is allowed for purposes
of the FSIA); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 96 F.3d 932, 941 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Gould,
Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 448-50 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); but see Gates v. Victor Fine
Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a corporation owned by an instrumentality of a foreign
government is not an instrumentality of that government).
95. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001). The court assumed without deciding that
the FSIA applies to companies that were government owned at the time of the conduct but has since been
privatized. See id. at 806.
96. See id. at 798. The class action was originally filed against Dole Food Co., which then impleaded Dead
Sea Bromine Company and Bromine Compounds Limited (the "Dead Sea Companies"). The government of
Israel owned a majority of shares in the Dead Sea Companies during the alleged conduct. See id.
97. Delgado, 231 F.3d at 176. For a fuller discussion of the Delgado opinion, see Douglas Mullen, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 INr'L LAw. 503, 504 (2001).
98. See Lehman Bros. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding FSIA applied to a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company owned by the Chinese government);
Musopole v. S. African Airways Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding FSIA applied to a cor-
poration in which the South African government indirectly had an 80% interest); Watkiss v. Corporate Jets,
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17839 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (finding jurisdiction under the FSIA where the French
government owned a majority interest in a corporation that had a majority interest in the defendant helicopter
manufacturing company).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
100. Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
101. See id. at 1146. A 'jus cogens" norm is one "accepted and recognized by the international community
... as a norm from which no derogation is permitted ..." Id. at 1149.
SUMMER 2002
438 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
must be construed narrowly and U.S. courts cannot interpret federal statutes according to
the "changing nuances of" customary law orjus cogens norms."12
In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit in Corzo v. Banco De Peru,"°3 considered
whether a foreign sovereign's waiver to suit in its own country constituted an implied waiver
to suit in the United States.104 Plaintiff sought to enforce a controversial Peruvian judg-
ment'0 against the Bank of Peru by attaching assets in the United States."°' Plaintiff argued
that because the bank submitted to litigation in Peru, it implicitly waived any immunity in
the United States.17 The court held that a sovereign's waiver of immunity in its own courts
does not constitute a waiver in U.S. courts, hence there was no jurisdiction under the
FSIA.1"a
However in a more straightforward situation, Lord Day v. Vietnam," 9 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that Vietnam waived its immunity by ap-
pearing to determine its entitlement to certain funds held by the court.' The funds at
issue constituted a settlement reached in 1975 for lost cargo owned by the Republic of
Vietnam near the Panama Canal. The settlement funds were still held in the United States,
because from 1975 to 1995 the U.S. government had banned all transfer of funds to the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam."' Despite its appearance in the district court, Vietnam as-
serted sovereign immunity under FSIA as to all claims against it regarding the funds. How-
ever, the court held Vietnam could not make such a limited appearance to decide only its
own entitlement to the funds, and thus found that Vietnam waived its immunity with respect
to all claims related to the settlement finds.112
D. FSIA AND HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
Although traditionally the state and its ruler were considered as one entity, the FSIA is
silent as to the issue of what sovereign immunity, if any, should be afforded to a sitting head
of state. Further, not many cases have explored the question. In Tachiona v. Mugabe,"' the
district court for the Southern District of New York examined whether the FSIA may be
used to breach Head of State immunity where a head of state is individually named in the
suit. Plaintiffs, citizens of Zimbabwe, alleged a campaign of violence against them by the
102. See id. at 1154.
103. Corzo v. Banco Cent. De Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001).
104. See id. at 522.
105. See id. Plaintiffs apparently received a valid final judgment by the Peruvian Supreme Court that had
subsequently been declared null and void.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 522-23. The plaintiffs also argued the bank explicitly waived its sovereign immunity and
presented expert opinions to show that under Peruvian law the bank was not immune from suit in the United
States The court ultimately rejected this argument. See id.
108. See id. at 524. In deciding this case the court examined opinions from other circuits that overwhelming
ruled amenability to suit in one country does not automatically subject a foreign sovereign to suit in the United
States. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1386 (8th Cir. 1992).
109. Lord Day & Day v. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 134 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
110. Seeid. at 557.
111. See id. at 554-55.
112. See id. at 559. The court held Vietnam implicitly waived its immunity only for the settlement funds,
which were deposited with the court immunity was not waived for other claims plaintiffs argued for other
property. See id.
113. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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President of Zimbabwe, other Government officials, and Zimbabwe's ruling political
party." 4 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Chuidian"I and its progeny, plaintiffs
urged that the FSIA-and not pre-FSIA immunity doctrines-applies to claims against,
individuals as agents or instrumentalities of the foreign state, and that sovereign immunity
ceases when such individuals act beyond the scope of their authority.116 Following its pre-
FSIA practice, the U.S. State Department entered a suggestion of immunity on behalf of
Mugabe and the Government officials. Following a different strand of case law than that
recommended by Plaintiffs, the court deferred to the State Department's suggestion of
immunity as had been the practice prior to the FSIA, and held the Government officials
retained immunity."7 However, the court did find jurisdiction over the ruling political party,
which enjoyed no immunity."'
E. SERVICE OF PRocEss
The FSIA provides explicit requirements for service of process for a foreign sovereign
or political subdivision and an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 9 Courts have
interpreted service requirements differently depending on whether a foreign state, agency
or instrumentality is to be served.l ° In Magness v. Russian Federation,'2' the Fifth Circuit
joined the majority of circuits finding strict compliance necessary for service of a foreign
state or political subdivision, while substantial compliance is permissible for service of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Plaintiffs are descendants of Russian citizens
whose property was expropriated during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918.122 Having been
unable to regain their property from Russian officials, they sued to attach Russian assets
located in the United States' The court remanded the case to the district court, finding
that plaintiffs neither strictly complied with service procedures for a foreign state nor sub-
stantially complied with service procedures for an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state.
2 4
114. See id. Plaintiffs claims included murder, torture, terrorism, rape, beatings, and destruction of property
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1998), and Torture Victim Protection Act, 28
U.S.C § 1350 (1998). These acts allegedly were committed to suppress political opposition groups prior to
Zimbabwe's June 2000 Parliamentary elections.
115. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
116. See Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 281-84.
117. See id. at 296-97. In dicta, the court was less clear as to whether it would honor a Suggestion of
Immunity by the State Department if the head of state's conduct fell under one of the commercial activity
exceptions of the FSIA. See id. at 296. Interestingly, the court did not explicitly discuss the terrorist acts
exception to immunity in the FSIA that was added in 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
118. See Tacbiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a-b).
120. See Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (requiring strict
compliance with section 1608(a) and substantial compliance with section 1608(b)); Gray v. Permanent Mission
of People's Republic of Congo, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding 1608(a) requires strict compliance);
Aberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250,253 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); Shererv. Construcciones
Aeronauticas S.A., 987 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding substantial compliance is permitted for section
1608(b)); Straub v. A.P. Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); but see LeDonne v. Gulf Air,
Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Va. 1988) (requiring strict compliance for section 1608(b)).
121. Magness v. Russian Fed'n, 247 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2001).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 617. Upon remand the court ordered the district court to allow the plaintiffs time to perfect
service upon the defendants. See id. at 618.
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I1. Personal Jurisdiction
DAVID A. LOMBARDERO*
A. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4(k)(2)
Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was added in 1993. It provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons ... is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal law, to
establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
The purpose of the rule is to "extend[] the reach of federal courts to impose jurisdiction
over the person of all defendants against whom federal law claims are made and who can
be constitutionally subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States."' 25 Prior
to the adoption of Rule 4(k)(2), a federal court could only exercise jurisdiction over a de-
fendant if a state court in the same state could do so, or if there was a federal statute that
specifically conferred jurisdiction.
1. Fiduciary Shield Doctrine Inapplicable When jurisdiction Rests on 4(k)(2)
In ISI International, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,'26 plaintiff corporation had sued
the defendant Canadian law firm for fraud, interference with contract, violation of the
Lanham Act, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction in Illinois, finding that the law firm had no contacts with
Illinois, and, even if it did, there was no federal jurisdiction because Illinois courts would
decline to exercise jurisdiction under the "fiduciary shield" doctrine because defendant's
acts were done solely in a fiduciary capacity to another client.'27
The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on Rule 4(k)(2), which the district court had not
invoked, the Seventh Circuit held that, with respect to claims based upon federal law, the
"minimum contacts" that must be analyzed are those with the United States as a whole,
rather than the particular forum state. 2' Because the defendant had ample contacts with
the United States and had failed to show that it was amenable to personal jurisdiction
elsewhere, the exercise of jurisdiction in Illinois was proper.2 9
The court then went on to reject application of the fiduciary shield doctrine. The court
characterized this doctrine as a creation of state courts to limit exercise of their jurisdiction
over defendants who act purely in a fiduciary capacity, the effect of which is to force venue
in the home state of the fiduciary. 30 The court held this doctrine inappropriate when ju-
risdiction is based on 4(k)(2), as it would preclude any federal jurisdiction, and in any event
*David A. Lombardero, counsel at Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Los Angeles, California.
125. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's note (1993).
126. ISI Int'l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2001).
127. This analysis ignored the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant law firm was in fact engaged to
represent it, rather than another client that now was adverse. Id. at 550.
128. See id. at 551-52.
129. See id. at 552.
130. See id. at 552-53.
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"its legitimate function is served by the doctrine of forum non conveniens."''1 1 The court
remanded for a fullforum non conveniens analysis. " 2
2. Establishing Jurisdiction When Defendant Defaults
System Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V iktor Kurnatovskiy was an admiralty case against a vessel
and its owner, Azov, in which plaintiff alleged that its cargo was damaged in transit to
Texas. 33 After being served with process in the Ukraine where it was based, Azov de-
faulted. 34 The district court then dismissed the action sua sponte, stating that plaintiff had
failed to establish that Azov was subject to either special or general jurisdiction in Texas. 3
Plaintiff appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for evaluation of whether, in this federal ad-
miralty claim, Azov was subject to general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) because of its
more extensive contacts with the United States as a whole rather than just with Texas.' 36
The court further held that although it is proper for a court to raise the issue of personal
jurisdiction sua sponte, the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to respond and present
evidence supporting jurisdiction." 7
B. TRANSIENT JURISDICTION: TEMPORARY PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT IN FORUM As BASIS FOR
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Although it may seem antiquated and at odds with the more modem minimum contacts
analysis used for assessing personal jurisdiction, defendants remain subject to general per-
sonal jurisdiction if served with process while in the forum state. 3 8 In Northern Light Tech-
nology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,'39 the First Circuit confronted the issue of whether
jurisdiction could be founded on service of process on the defendant while he was in the
forum attending a hearing in the matter in which he was served.
Defendant Burgar, a resident of Canada, was sued in Massachusetts district court based
upon both federal and state law claims regarding his use of an internet domain name that
allegedly was confusingly similar to the plaintiff's.' 4° Burgar apparently was served with
process in Canada and contested jurisdiction. He traveled to Boston to attend a hearing on
personal jurisdiction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the same case.
Just before the hearing, he was again served with process.' 4' The district court granted the
131. Id. at 553.
132. See id. at 554. The court did not discuss whether, if the district court retained jurisdiction over the
Lanham Act claims, it would have jurisdiction over the state law cases. The text of Rule 4(k)(2), as well as the
numerous decisions dealing with the necessity to evaluate jurisdiction over each claim separately, suggest other-
wise.
133. System Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2001).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 324.
136. See id. at 324-25.
137. See id. at 325.
138. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
based upon the defendant's presence in the forum state on unrelated business when served with process com-
ported with due process).
139. Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
140. See id. at 58-60.
141. See id. at 60.
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TRO application. It subsequently ruled that, independent of the service at the courthouse,
the court had jurisdiction based upon Burgar's contacts with Massachusetts; found in favor
of the plaintiff on the merits; and converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. 42
Burgar appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Rather than basing jurisdiction on Burgar's contacts with
the forum, however, the court looked to the service of process made while he was in court
for the hearing. Relying upon Burnham and Massachusetts state law precedent, the court
held that such service comported with due process.143 The court then rejected Burgar's
argument that he was immune from service of process because he was in Massachusetts for
the sole purpose of attending a personal jurisdiction hearing in the same lawsuit. The court
held that such immunity is at the discretion, and for the convenience, of the court holding
the hearing in order to further judicial administration, and not for the benefit of the party
seeking to avoid service.'44 In addition, such immunity from service of process historically
had been limited to service in judicial proceedings unrelated to that for which the defendant
had traveled to the forum.145 Because Burgar had not sought or obtained immunity from
service of process prior to traveling to Massachusetts, and did not present a compelling case
why such immunity should be extended, the service was valid and conferred jurisdiction
over him.'"
C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION UPHELD AGAINST INDIVIDUAL BASED UPON SINGLE
TRANSACTION CONDUCTED OUT-OF-STATE
In Neal v. Janssen,'17 plaintiffs were Tennessee residents who owned a horse boarded in
the Netherlands. Plaintiffs met with defendant Janssen, a Belgian citizen, at a house that
he then owned in Florida, and agreed to pay him a 10 percent commission if he arranged
an acceptable sale of their horse. '41
After calling in and faxing several offers that plaintiffs found unacceptable, Janssen called
to present an offer from a third party that was substantially below their offering price.
Plaintiffs accepted this final offer when Janssen insisted they were asking too much and
agreed to waive his commission. After receiving payment, the Neals learned that the third
party actually paid Janssen nearly $150,000 more for the horse than they received. Plaintiffs
brought suit against Janssen in federal court in Tennessee, seeking damages for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty.149 Janssen unsuccessfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction."1° He then declined to defend, and judgment was entered in favor of the plain-
tiffs. Janssen appealed the jurisdictional ruling.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the "purposeful availment" require-
ment for minimum contacts was satisfied by Janssen's calls and faxes to Tennessee because
the fraudulent calls and faxes formed the basis for plaintiffs' tort claims."'1
142. See id. at 60-61.
143. Id. at 61-62.
144. See id. at 62.
145. See id. at 62-63.
146. See id. at 63.
147. Neal V. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2001).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 330-31.
151. See id. at 332.
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This case is noteworthy primarily because courts have shown more reluctance to exercise
long-arm jurisdiction over foreign individuals than over corporations. The court concluded,
however, that the exercise of jurisdiction over Janssen in Tennessee was reasonable despite
his Belgian citizenship based on the quality of his connections with Tennessee, coupled with
Janssen's international travel and former ownership of a house in Florida.'52
D. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS WITHOUT REGARD TO MINIMUM CONTACTS
Altmann v. Republic of Austria,1'" arose out of the World War II appropriation of original
Gustov Klimt paintings belonging to plaintiff's uncle. After encountering prohibitive filing
fees in Austria because of the value of the paintings, plaintiff brought suit in federal court
in Los Angeles. 14 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.'5
The court first held that defendants could not invoke sovereign immunity to preclude
subject matter jurisdiction.116 With regard to personal jurisdiction, the court followed a
"suggestion" from the Supreme Court" 7 and decisions from the D.C. District Court,'
holding that foreign states are not "persons" protected by the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 59 Accordingly, the court held that as long as the requirements of FSIA
jurisdiction are satisfied, the court has personal jurisdiction over defendants regardless of
whether their contacts with the forum are sufficient to satisfy a minimum contacts analysis.
This question does not usually arise in typical commercial cases against sovereigns, be-
cause under the FSIA such "commercial exception" litigation requires a showing of com-
mercial activity in or directed at the United States, which most likely also would suffice to
show minimum contracts. As a result, appellate courts generally assume without analysis
that the minimum contacts analysis applies to foreign governments and agencies thereof. 6
E. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
"Legislative jurisdiction" refers to a state's lawmaking powers - specifically the power
of a state to apply its laws to specific facts and persons. Thus, legislative jurisdiction is
integral to the concept of extraterritoriality, rather than personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
in recent years the concepts have intersected when states have attempted to use their reg-
152. Id. at 333.
153. Altman v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
154. See id. at 1196.
155. See id. at 1197.
156. See id. at 1203-05. For a description of the FSIA issues, see supra, at text accompanying notes 78-82.
157. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (explicitly declining to decide whether
a foreign state is a "person" under the Due Process Clause, because due process was clearly satisfied) (citing
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (holding that states are not "persons" under the Due
Process Clause).
158. See World Wide Minerals Ltd. v. Republic ofKazakhstan, 116 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2000); Daliberti
v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1998). The L.A. district court also cited several circuit court decisions since Weltover, where the
courts have declined to decide whether foreign states are persons under the Due Process Clause. See Theo. H.
Davies & Co. v. Republic of the Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1998); S. & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. The
Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Hanil Bank v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127
(2d Cir. 1998).
159. See Atmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-08.
160. See, e.g., U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135, 151-53 (2d Cir. 2001).
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ulatory powers to reach affiliates of companies that do business in the state. Courts have
borrowed the due process concepts applicable to personal jurisdiction to analyze the per-
missibility of such regulation.
In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher,161 several insurers operating in Florida
challenged the constitutionality of Florida's Holocaust Victims Insurance Act (Holocaust
Act). Plaintiffs, U.S.-based insurers, had been subpoenaed under the Act to produce infor-
mation regarding Holocaust-era policies issued by insurance companies with merely a cor-
porate affiliation with the plaintiff insurers and no contacts in Florida. 62 Under the Ho-
locaust Act, plaintiffs could have been required to pay claims by Florida residents against
their affiliates, and could be subject to private civil suits and penalties for failing to do so.'
Plaintiff insurers contended, inter alia, that the Holocaust Act violated their rights to
Due Process under the U.S. Constitution. l6 The trial court and the Court of Appeals
agreed. The Eleventh Circuit held that a minimal contacts analysis similar to that applied
in personal jurisdiction cases must be used to evaluate the constitutionality of exercising
legislative jurisdiction, holding that "[t]he relevant question is whether there exists some
minimal contact between a State and the regulated subject," requiring an inquiry "not only
into the contacts between the regulated party and the state, but also into the contacts
between the regulated subject matter and the state."'' 65
The appellate court concluded that the purpose of the Holocaust Act was not to regulate
insurers doing business in Florida, but rather to force the payment of claims by insurers
that had no contacts with Florida, under policies that had also nothing to do with Florida.)6
Because there was no agency or control relationship (such as alter ego) between the plaintiff
insurers and the insurers that issued the policies, there were insufficient contacts to the
subject being regulated. Consequently, Florida's Holocaust Act "violate[d] Due Process
Limits on legislative jurisdiction."" 67
IV. Discovery
JOSEPH J. DEHNER*
Despite the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention), l1 8 U.S. federal courts continue to ap-
161. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11 th Cir. 2001).
162. See id. at 1231.
163. See id. at 1230-31.
164. See id. at 1232. The United States intervened on behalf of the insurers, arguing that Florida's Holocaust
Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the foreign affairs powers of the federal government. The
court did not reach these issues. Id. at 1234 n.4.
165. See id. at 1236 (internal quotes omitted; emphasis in original). Prior Supreme Court precedents to
which the court looked included Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (taxation); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (insurance); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)
(insurance); and Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (insurance). These cases
involve issues of choice-of-law and extraterritoriality, as well as personal jurisdiction.
166. See Gerling Global, 267 F.3d at 1238.
167. Id. at 1240.
*Joseph J. Dehner is a partner at Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, and is a Vice-Chair of the
ABA International Litigation Committee.
168. Convention on the Traking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, openedforsignature
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744 [Hague Evidence Convention].
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ply the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Decisions reported in
2001 reflected attentiveness to discovery abuse against foreign parties and witnesses, but
basic application of familiar U.S. discovery principles, in accordance with Societe National
Aerospatiale v. United States.169 Several courts used the Hague Evidence Convention as a
reason to send cases to foreign courts, where discovery of key foreign witnesses would be
more likely. Finally, U.S. courts continued to assist foreign governments in discovery related
to civil and criminal proceedings.
A. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
1. Discovery Of Foreign Party Witnesses Allowed under Federal Rules-but with Limits
Aerospatiale influenced several recent decisions involving discovery of foreign party wit-
nesses, such that courts applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the Hague
Evidence Convention. Nevertheless, attention to the principles of the Hague Evidence
Convention resulted in narrowed discovery in several cases, and none at all in one dispute.
The Vitamin Antitrust litigation saw a court order extensive merits discovery of defen-
dants from Japan, Germany, and SwitzerlandY °0 Because Japan is not a member of the
Hague Convention, the court applied the Federal Rules without further analysis, forcing
Japanese defendants to respond to Rule 33 & 34 discovery requests. German and Swiss
defendants, whose nations are Convention members, objected to broad interrogatories and
document requests seeking over twenty years of financial data and the identification of
company personnel. Noting that, almost without exception, courts have allowed merits
discovery against foreign entities to proceed under the Federal Rules, the special master
affirmed by the court, addressed three Aerospatiale factors. It found that both the facts of
the case and the conclusion that Hague Evidence Convention procedures would not prove
effective strongly favored Federal Rule usage. The balancing of sovereign interests also
slightly favored the Federal Rules, given the United States' strong interest in antitrust
enforcement. 17 l
Similarly, district courts in New York'72 and California'73 applied the Federal Rules to
force foreign parties to provide U.S.-style discovery, including depositions to be taken in
the United States. However, at the jurisdictional contest stage of a litigation against Mich-
elin, a district court in Iowa granted a protective order strictly limiting deposition discovery,
barring depositions of senior personnel of foreign parties.7
4
169. Aerospatiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
170. In re Vitamin Antitrust Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11536 (D.D.C. April 23, 2001). A prior
decision in the same case upheld Federal Rule discovery for jurisdictional purposes. See Joseph Dehner, Dis-
covery, 35 INT'L LAW. 520-21 (2001).
171. Id. at 35, 45.
172. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (French privacy, bank secrecy, and other
laws did not justify protective order against discovery from foreign bank involving World War II funds of
Jewish customer; "close supervision" of discovery promised).
173. In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19981 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2001) (denying
protective order requiring all 30(b)(6) depositions be held in Singapore and ordering Rule 30(b)(1) depositions
in the United States of Singapore Airlines and Rule 30(b)(1) depositions in Singapore of airline pilots, based
on determination that pilots are "managing agents" of an airline), aff'd in part by 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 466
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2002) (denying determination that first officers were managing agents).
174. Bandag, Inc. v. Michelin Retread Tech., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (limiting plaintiff to
30(b)(6) depositions at this time).
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2. IRS Could Compel Foreign Resident to Respond to Administrative Summons
In a 2001 opinion, the IRS concluded that it could use the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters to
force a U.S. citizen residing in the United Kingdom to appear in London to answer ques-
tions in aid of a U.S. tax audit.'7 5
3. Hague Evidence Convention a Reason to Deny U.S. Venue of Disputes Involving Foreign
Witnesses
Based in part on the perceived inability to obtain discovery of foreign witnesses if a U.S.
court were to proceed to litigate disputes where foreign witness testimony was important,
four U.S. courts dismissed proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds. In Valarezo v.
Ecuadorian Line, Inc."6 and Ramakrishna v. Besser Co. I" district courts dismissed in favor of
proceedings abroad-in Ecuador and India respectively, which are non-signatories to the
Hague Evidence Convention-making discovery in the United States extremely difficult.
Similarly, in both Durkin v. Intervac, Inc."18 and First Union National Bank v. Banque Paribas79
the district courts granted motions to dismiss forforum non conveniens upon balancing the
public and private interest factors and finding that the cases had greater connection to
foreign jurisdictions. Although Australia and the United Kingdom are signatories to the
Hague Evidence Convention, their opting out of the Convention's letters of request pro-
vision made it equally difficult to access and question the relevant witnesses in the United
States
B. U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In addition to addressing the question of discovery from foreign entities for use in U.S.
proceedings, U.S. courts assist foreign courts in obtaining evidence from U.S. residents in
civil and criminal matters. In re Request from Canada's° involved a Canadian Government
investigation of smuggling and tax evasion. Applying the U.S.-Canadian Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the district court enforced subpoenas ordering a U.S.
resident to provide testimony that was arguably not discoverable in Canada. Faced with a
split of authority over whether a U.S. court should apply foreign discovery rules when
responding to foreign government requests for discovery assistance, the court ordered U.S.-
style discovery, but observed that the Canadian courts could later determine its admissibility
in the Canadian proceeding.''
175. IRS CCA 200143032; 2001 WTD 210-19.
176. Valarezo v. Ecuadorian Line, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8942, *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2001).
177. Ramakrishna v. Besser Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (dismissing case involving Indian
joint venture, noting that India is not a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, so that letters of request
were not available and "only India can provide the required compulsory process" for Indian witnesses).
178. Durkin v. Intervac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 782 A.2d 103 (S. Ct. Conn. 2001) (dismissing case involving
military crash in Australia, noting Australia's opting out of Article 23, such that it need not execute letters of
request, and noting that the foreign defendants had offered to provide proper discovery in Australia if the case
proceeded there).
179. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Banque Paribas, 135 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
180. In re Request from Canada, 155 F. Supp. 2d 515 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
181. See id. at 520.
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V. Service of Process Abroad
JULIAN Ku*
In 2001, federal appellate courts maintained their silence on significant questions in-
volving the service of process abroad. Those state and federal district courts faced with
questions involving service of process abroad continued to focus on the interpretation of
the Hague Convention's provisions governing service by mail and service by private per-
sons. Additionally, a few courts continued to develop the law governing the service of
process abroad in countries not signatory to the Hague Convention.
A. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Article 10 (a)
State and federal courts continued to disagree on whether language in Article 10(a) of
the Hague Convention granting "the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal chan-
nels, directly to persons abroad," authorizes service of process by mail or whether it merely
authorizes the transmission of documents other than process by mail.is2
The central disagreement turns on the reading of "send" in Article 10(a). While two
federal district courts continued to adhere to a liberal reading of"send" authorizing service
by mail as long as the signatory country has not objected, 8 3 a key New York state appeals
court reversed its earlier adherence to the liberal position declaring that "we are now con-
vinced that the contrary interpretation ... is the better reasoned especially in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court's reading of 'service' in the Hague Convention as a term of art, re-
ferring specifically to the process that initiates a lawsuit and secures jurisdiction over an
adversary party."1 4
Other courts, one state and one federal, also endorsed this narrow reading.' This con-
tinuing disagreement over the scope of Article 10(a), which has split federal and state ap-
pellate circuits as well as federal and state district courts, suggests that plaintiffs should, in
the abundance of caution, avoid reliance on service of process by mail pursuant to the Hague
Convention.
2. Service by Private Persons
Courts were also faced with issues arising out of plaintiffs' attempts to effect service of
process by private persons. The general view, unchanged in 2001, is that service of process
*Julian Ku is an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York.
182. Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention reads: "Provided the State of destination does not object, the
present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels,
directly to persons abroad ......
183. Nuovo Pignone Spa v. MIV Storman Asia, 167 F. Supp. 2d. 911, 914-15 (E.D. La. 2001); McCarron
v. British Telecom, No. Civ.A. 00-CV-6123, 2001 WL 632927, *2 (E.D. Pa., June 6, 2001).
184. Sardanis v. Sumitomo Corp., 279 A.D.2d 225, 229 (1st Dep't 2001) (reversing earlier decision in Philip
v. Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp., 169 A.D.2d 603, 565 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dep't 1991) and citing Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988)).
185. Eggear v. Shibusawa Warehouse Co., Ltd, No. CIV.A. 00-CV-4636, 2001 WL 267881, *5-*6 (E.D.
Pa., March 19, 2001) (recognizing split within Eastern District of Pennyslvania); Bednarskyv. Rose Wreath &
Tree, No. CV010379777S, 2001 WL 1004372, *2-*3 (Conn. Super. July 27, 2001) (citing consistent Con-
necticut authority in support of narrow reading but finding such authority unnecessary to reach holding).
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by private persons is authorized by Article 10(c) of the Hague Convention as long as
(1) the foreign signatory has not objected to service under Article 10(c); and (2) service was
effected by a "competent person[ ]" as defined by the State of destination.8 6 Moreover,
service under this provision need not conform to service regulations (such as provided in
translation form) imposed on service through the Central Authority under Article 5.
Where service by private persons does not conform to the internal law of the state of
destination, courts have rejected attempts to justify service by private persons under the
broad language of Article 19 authorizing service by any method "permitted" by the "internal
law of the contracting State." Specifically, courts have refused to read "permits" in Article
19 to allow any alternative service method to which the signatory State has not explicitly
objected."' Such a broad reading, the Supreme Court of Nevada observed, would under-
mine the Hague Convention's goals for creating uniformity when effecting service abroad
because the broad reading would require signatory states to "embrace a multifarious set of
service methods." 188 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
explained that the broad reading would place contracting states in the "awkward and dif-
ficult position of having to imagine every sort of objectionable or obnoxious mode of ser-
vice."' 189 In doing so, both courts acknowledged that their narrow reading of Article 19 was
inconsistent with results reached by other courts as well as views expressed by some com-
mentators. 9°
3. Additional Signatories to the Hague Convention
Three countries became signatories to the Hague Convention in 2001: Ukraine on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001; Argentina on February 2, 2001; and the Russian Federation on May 1, 2001.
B. SERVIcE ABROAD IN NON-SIGNATORIES OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Courts also confronted cases where plaintiffs sought to effect service in circumstances
where the Hague Convention does not apply. Where a defendant resided in Haiti, a non-
signatory country, personal service of process consistent with state law is still not proper
absent proof that Haitian law permits service of process by that method.' 91 On the other
hand, where the defendants' precise whereabouts are unknown and are not amenable to
service by any method recognized in either the Hague Convention or federal law, service
can be effectuated by publication for six weeks in media outlets reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. 92 The court carefully noted that the de-
186. See Ingram Micro, Inc. v. Liafaison Rapide Peguin, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 12480 (SAS), 2001 WL 282696,
*5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001).
187. EPLUS Technology v. Aboud, 155 F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (E.D. Va. 2001), Dahye v. Second Judicial
District of Nevada, 19 P.3d 239, 243-45 (Nev. 2001).
188. Daye, 19 P.3d at 243.
189. EPLUS, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
190. See, e.g., Boro Latino, S.A.C.A., v. Gomex Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1279-80 (S.D.Fla. 1999); Donald
Siegle, Supplemental Practice Commentaries, § C-4-24 and 64, following 28 U.S.C.A. Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 9 (West 1998).
191. Jacques v. Jacques, No. FA000162261S, 2001 WL 576667, *2 (Conn. Sup., May 10, 2001).
192. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Nos. 01 CIV 10132 (HB) 01 CIV 10144 (HB), 2001 WL
1658211, *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001).
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fendants, Osama bin Laden and members of al Qaeda, may later choose to contest the
court's jurisdiction as well as the means of service.
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON LETTERS ROGATORY
There were no new signatories to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
or the Additional Protocol to the Convention in 2001.
VI. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
GLENN W RHODES AND LISA S. BucCINO*
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards governs recognition and enforcement by U.S. courts of foreign arbitration
awards. 193 The principles of comity as set forth in Hilton v. Guyot govern recognition and
enforcement by U.S. courts of foreign court judgments 94 Although no federal statute or
treaty covers the enforcement of foreign court judgments, many states have adopted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which codifies the principles set
forth in Hilton.19
A Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is pre-
paring a draft Convention on international jurisdiction and the effects of foreign judgments.
This Special Commission conducted the second in a series of four meetings at The Hague
from March 3-13, 1998.196 On June 18, 1999, the Special Commission provisionally
adopted a preliminary draft Convention. 97 The Special Commission revised the draft Con-
vention at a meeting held at The Hague during October 1999.19s The Diplomatic Confer-
ence to prepare the final text of the Convention will be conducted in two sessions. The
first session was held in June 2001.I99 The second session will be held sometime during the
course of 2002.2°0
*Glenn W. Rhodes and Lisa S. Buccino are attorneys in the law firm of Howrey Simon Arnold White, LLP,
Menlo Park, California.
193. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, TIAS 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (the "Convention").
194. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
195. See generally Christopher Givson, International Litigation, 31 Irr'L LAw. 347 (1997) (discussing the
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A. CASES CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1. Defenses to Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards Based on Immunity
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSJA) °1 grants immunity to foreign states from
suit in the United States unless an exception applies. 02 One exception arises when the
foreign sovereign has agreed to arbitration in a Convention state. In International Insurance
Co. v. Caja Nacional de Aborro Y Seguro, °5 the issue was whether the FSIA exempted the
defendant from posting a security bond prior to filing an answer in proceedings to confirm
an arbitral award. After receiving an arbitration award against Caja Nacional de Ahorro Y
Seguro (Caja), International Insurance filed a petition in district court to confirm the award.
Caja filed an answer, and International Insurance moved for an order to require Caja to
post a security bond and to strike Caja's answer. Caja asserted that under the FSIA,204 it
was immune from the requirement to post a security bond because it was an instrumentality
of a foreign government and that the posting of a security bond amounted to a pre-judgment
attachment.05 The district court disagreed because the FSIA provision asserted by Caja as
a basis for exemption was subject to the provisions of the New York Convention.20 The
district court observed that Article VI of the New York Convention permitted the court to
order a party challenging an arbitral award to post a security bond if the challenger applied
to set aside or suspend the award.2 °7 The district court concluded that, in effect, Caja had
moved to suspend or set aside the award by filing an answer and asserting twenty-six affir-
mative defenses.o s Accordingly, the court held that under the New York Convention, Caja
was not immune from posting a security bond.209
2. Decisions Subiect to Confirmation under the Convention
A foreign judgment confirming a foreign arbitral award may not necessarily be enforce-
able in the United States under the New York Convention. It may, however, be enforceable
under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Act and the principles of comity. In Ocean
Warehousing B. V v. Baron Metals and Alloys, Inc., '10 a dispute arose amongst a Netherlands-
201. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994). For a discussion of the FSIA, see
International Litigation, 34 INr'L LAW. 553 (2000).
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
203. 2001 WL 322005 (N.D. II.).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 states that:
[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of
enacunent of this Act the property of the United States or a foreign state shall be immune from
attachment arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of the chapter.
205. See Int'l Ins., 2001 WL 322005 at 1. The plaintiff relied on the Illinois insurance law, which requires
a foreign or alien company to post a pre-judgment security bond prior to filing any pleadings with the court
to secure payment of any final judgment entered by the court. See id. (citing 215 ILCS 5/123(5)). Caja alleged
that under New York insurance law, the posting of a security bond constituted a pre-judgment attachment
under the FSIA. See id. (citing Stephens v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1230 (2d Cir. 1995)).
206. See id. FSIA section 1609 provides that it is "subject to existing international agreements." The district
court noted that the New York Convention was enacted prior to the FSIA and that both the United States
and Argentina were signatories to the New York Convention. Id.
207. See id. at 2 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 201; Skandia America Reinsurance Corp. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y
Seguro, 1997 WL 278054 (S.D.N.Y.)).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Ocean Warehousing B.U. v. Baron Metals and Alloys, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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based forwarding agent (Ocean Warehousing) and importers and exporters of metal goods.
The dispute arose when the defendants, Baron Metals and Alloys, a New York corporation
(Baron), and Marco International (Marco), a Hong Kong corporation having a place of
business in New York, failed to reimburse Ocean Warehousing for money it advanced to
the Dutch government for taxes.2 ' In keeping with the terms of their correspondence,
Ocean Warehousing commenced arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands in accordance
with the Dutch Forwarding Conditions."' Baron and Marco failed to appear in the arbi-
tration proceedings, and a default judgment was entered against the defendants by the
arbitration panel.2"3 The district court in Rotterdam confirmed the arbitral award as a Dutch
judgment.'14 Ocean Engineering then sought to enforce the Dutch arbitral award in the
United States under the New York Convention, and the district court granted an ex parte
order of attachment against Baron and Marco." 5 As Ocean Engineering moved to confirm
the attachment, Baron and Marco filed cross-motions to vacate the attachment. The de-
fendants asserted that the attachment order should be vacated, arguing Ocean Engineering's
inability to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its confirmation action.
Specifically, the defendants asserted that Dutch law failed to provide an opportunity to raise
the Convention-enumerated defenses during the Dutch court proceedings confirming the
arbitral award as a Dutch judgment. The district court rejected the defendants' arguments.
The district court observed that attachment was authorized where a judgment qualifies for
recognition under Article 53, New York's codification of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act.2" The district court noted that New York law requires rec-
ognition of a final, enforceable and conclusive foreign money-judgment, stating that "[tlhe
Convention defenses simply do not apply to an Article 53 proceeding seeking recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if that judgment was based on a foreign
arbitral award."2 7
The district court distinguished two cases cited by the defendants for the proposition
that a foreign judgment based on a domestic arbitral award is invalid if the foreign forum
failed to allow assertion of the Convention-enumerated defenses.2"s In the first case, Foto-
chrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,2i 9 a Japanese creditor's bankruptcy action based on a Japanese
arbitral award and brought in New York, the district court noted that under Japanese law
an arbitral award is given the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment between the
parties. 20 However, the district court found that the Second Circuit declined to recognize
the Japanese arbitral award as a final judgment under the Bankruptcy Act because the "self-
executing" judgment failed to provide the losing party with an opportunity to assert the
211. Seeid. at 247.
212. See id. The communications from Ocean Engineering, such as price quotes and invoices, contained
standard language, in both Dutch and English, providing that Ocean Engineering's services were always gov-
erned by the latest version of the Dutch Forwarding Conditions, including the arbitration clauses. See id. The
arbitration clause mandates that disputes be resolved by arbitration. See id. at n.2.
213. Seeid. at 247.
214. See id.
215. Seeid. at 246.
216. Seeid. at 248.
217. Id. at 249.
218. Seeid. at 251.
219. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
220. Ocean Warehousing, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
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Convention-enumerated defenses.-1 The district court noted that both Baron and Marco
had the opportunity to contest the arbitral award in the Netherlands before the award was
confirmed as a Dutch judgment, but failed to do so.222 The second case, Seetransport Wiking
Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala2"' involved a French
decree conferring exequatur on an arbitral award obtained in a non-domestic (i.e., non-
French) proceeding to which the Convention defenses applied.114 The district court noted
that in Seetransport, the Second Circuit found that the French process of obtaining exequatur
allows the losing party to challenge the arbitral award based on the Convention-enumerated
defenses, unlike the circumstances underlying the Second Circuit's Fotochrome decision. 25
The district court concluded, however, that the Second Circuit's decision in Seetransport,
failed to support the defendants' contention "that a foreign judgment is only enforceable
under Article 53 where the foreign proceeding afforded the losing party the opportunity
to raise the Convention defenses. '226 Rather, the district court observed that Seetransport
involved a foreign proceeding confirming a non-domestic arbitral award, hence distinguish-
ing Seetransport from the circumstances in Ocean Warehousing where the foreign judgment
confirmed a domestic arbitral award1 27
3. Oppositions to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Attempting to overturn an award during the confirmation proceeding is difficult. The
Convention restricts a district court's ability to review an award for its validity.22s The
district court must confirm the award unless it finds one of the Convention-enumerated
grounds for refusing or deferring recognition of the award.29 The party challenging con-
221. See id.
222. See id. The district court also added that the defendants would be permitted to raise the Convention
defenses when the court determined whether to recognize the foreign arbitral award as a U.S. judgment, but
considered the Convention defenses to be irrelevant where the issue was whether the attachment should be
confirmed or vacated. See id. Nevertheless, the district court also noted that some doubt existed as to whether
the court would ever address the merits of the defendants' Convention defenses given the ability of the court
to either convert the foreign judgment or the foreign arbitral award to a U.S. judgment. See id. at n. 8 (citing
Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1973)).
223. Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBB & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala, Navala, 29
F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994).
224. See Ocean Warebousing, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 250-51.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 251.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Yusaf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
229. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1999). Article V of the Convention sets forth five grounds for refusing to recognize a
foreign arbitral award as follows: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom
the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contem-
plated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or (e) The award has not yet
become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made. Convention, art. V(1). Two other grounds are possible
under the Convention as well. Enforcement can be refused if the subject matter being arbitrated is not capable
of be settled by arbitration, or the recognition of the award would be contrary to public policy. Convention,
art. V(2).
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firmation of the arbitral award bears the burden of proving the existence of one of the
enumerated grounds barring recognition of the award.2
a. Lack of Notice
Under Article V(1)(b), lack of proper notice is grounds for a court's refusal to recognize
and enforce an award. In First State Insurance Co. v. Banco de Seguros del Estado,T1M a series of
treaties governed the obligations of thirty-one reinsurers to reinsure First State's casualty
business. After a dispute arose concerning the obligations under the treaties, First State
invoked the treaties' arbitration provisions. The arbitration panel issued two awards. The
first award was directed to the group of reinsurers and the second award was directed to
Banco specifically.232 Banco refused to comply with the awards, and First State filed suit to
enforce the awards in U.S. district court pursuant to the Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards."' Banco denied receiving actual or proper notice
of the arbitration proceedings and moved to vacate the awards under Article V(1)(b) of the
Convention.11
4
The district court concluded that Banco received proper notice under the Convention,
and Banco appealed.2" The First Circuit noted the following undisputed facts contained
in the record. First State sent a notice demanding arbitration to Banco via registered mail.
Although no mail receipt was in evidence, there was no evidence that First State's notice
was returned. In addition, the intermediary (G.L. Hodson & Sons) pursuant to the Inter-
mediary Clause of the Treaties received a copy of notice sent by First State, as did Grupe
Kleber, the underwriting pool through which Banco reinsured First State. Group Kleber
acknowledged receipt of the notice and requested additional time to appoint an arbitrator
on behalf of the reinsurers, including Banco. Thereafter, a London law firm advised First
State that it had been contacted by Banco regarding the arbitration, and an attorney for a
New York firm advised First State that his firm had been retained to represent the reinsurers,
including Banco, in the arbitration proceedings. The New York attorney signed the Terms
of Reference with First State before the arbitration panel on behalf of the reinsurers, in-
cluding Banco, which provided that notice to counsel is deemed notice to the parties. Dur-
ing the course of the arbitration hearings, the panel ordered Banco to post security, which
Banco failed to do. Banco then notified its London law firm and Groupe Kieber that it had
not received any arbitration notice from First State. In addition, the New York attorney
representing the reinsurers notified the arbitration panel that Banco declined to post se-
curity, that Banco maintained it was not a party to the arbitration, and that it was ques-
tionable whether he had authority to act further on behalf of Banco in the arbitration.2 6
The First Circuit concluded that Banco received proper notice, directly and indirectly,
through Groupe Kleber and the contractually established intermediary, G.L. Hodson &
Sons.237 Since the intermediary was designated by the reinsurers to receive all communi-
230. First State Ins. Co. v. Banco de Seguros Del Estado, 254 F.3d 354, 357 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Imperial
Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1976)).
231. First State Ins. Co. v. Banco Seguros del Estado, 254 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2001).
232. See id.
233. See id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 203 (hereinafter "the Convention")).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 356.
237. See id. at 357.
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cations on their behalf, the First Circuit concluded that notice to G.L. Hodson & Sons was
sufficient notice to Banco under the intermediary provision of the Treaty." ' The First
Circuit further noted that Banco's interests in the arbitration were represented by persons
of "apparent authority and mutuality of interests,"239 and that "Banco can only blame its
own administration or that of its agents or representatives whom it deems to have acted
without actual authority or who may have failed to comply with their duties or obliga-
tions."240
b. Waiver and Due Process
Waiver is not one of the enumerated defenses to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award under Article (V)(1). In Consorico Rive, S.A. de C.V v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 4 1 Con-
sorico Rive (Rive) sought to enforce its Mexican arbitral award in U.S. district court against
Briggs of Cancun (Briggs). The arbitration pertained to an agreement entered into between
Rive and Briggs wherein Rive provided property to Briggs for operation of a restaurant in
Cancun.242 As a defense to enforcement of the award, Briggs asserted that Rive waived the
right to arbitration when Rive's attorney filed a Criminal Statement of Facts requesting the
attorney general of Quintana Roo, Mexico to commence an investigation into whether
David A. Briggs, Jr. and others conspired to deprive Rive of certain property interests in
the property at issue.243 The district court concluded that as a matter of law Briggs's waiver
defense was unavailing because waiver of the right to arbitrate "is not among the seven
defenses to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award set forth in the Convention."244 The
district court further observed that Fifth Circuit law did not favor a finding of waiver to
arbitrate,2 4 noting further the Supreme Court's instruction that doubts over the scope of
arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration regardless of whether the issue
relates to contract construction or defenses to arbitrability such as waiver or delay.2" More-
over, even if waiver was available as a defense, Fifth Circuit law instructs that waiver occurs
only when the judicial process is substantially invoked by the party seeking arbitration to
the detriment or prejudice of the other party. 47 The district court commented that for the
invocation of the judicial process to be "substantial," the act must be inconsistent with a
desire to arbitrate, such as some combination of answering a complaint, preparing a coun-
terclaim or participating in discovery. 4s Prejudice results from forcing a party to participate
in and bear the expense of litigation, which arbitration is designed to avoid. 49 In concluding
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 358. The First Circuit noted that proper notice is notice that satisfies due process under the
forum state's laws. See id. at 357 (citing Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir.
1992)). The First Circuit noted that under our law, the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, and to
be heard in a meaningful manner, constituted the fundamental requirement of due process. See id. at 358 (citing
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
241. Consorico Rive, S.A. de C.V. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La 2001).
242. See id. at 790-91.
243. See id. at 791.
244. Id. at 795.
245. See id.
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that Rive failed to waive arbitration, the district court found that the Statement of Facts
filed by Rive's attorney was not inconsistent with Rive's desire to arbitrate, noting that the
Statement was filed some eight months after the request for arbitration was made, and that
Brigg's was not prejudiced by Rive's isolated action of merely filing the Statement. 50
Also at issue was whether Briggs was unable to present its case during the arbitration in
violation of the due process guarantee of Article V(1)(b) of the Convention. Although Briggs
filed a responsive brief, with attachments, addressing the allegations raised by Rive, Briggs
refused to participate in further arbitration proceedings due to alleged criminal proceedings
in Cancun, citing as evidence a letter from the United Mexican States Solicitor of the
General Republic requesting the appearance of David Briggs. The letter inferred that David
Briggs could be subject to arrest for failure to appear.25' David Briggs testified that he
voluntarily decided to not comply with the appearance request, and that he did not seek
alternative means to attend the arbitration proceedings. In addition, David Briggs testified
that he did not send a company representative to appear at the proceedings, nor did Briggs's
Mexican counsel attend the proceedings. The district court found that Briggs could have
participated in the proceedings by alternative means, such as by phone, sending a company
representative, or by sending Mexican counsel.252 Accordingly, the district court concluded
that a defense to enforcement of the arbitral award was unavailable under Article V(1)(b).253
c. Setting Aside Arbitration Awards
The grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the Convention are limited to the
justifications supplied by Article V of the Convention.254 According to Article V(1)(e), a
court shall not recognize an arbitration award which has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.255 In PM.I. Trading Ltd. v. Farstad Oil, Petitioner, P.M.I. Trading (PMI) sought to
confirm an arbitration award for damages resulting out of a contractual dispute.2s6 Respon-
dent, Farstad, argued that the court should not confirm the award because the arbitration
panel exhibited manifest disregard of the law when interpreting a term in the parties' con-
tract. Under the contract, Farstad had an obligation to deliver to PMI certain quantities of
liquified petroleum gas via railcar to a PMI terminal in Mexico where an independent
inspector would assess the amount of gas and credit PMI for any amount for which it paid
but did not receive. This extra amount was referred to as the "volume remaining on
board."257 Despite the use of an independent inspector, the parties disagreed as to how
calculate the remaining volume. PMI and the inspector concluded that the remaining vol-
ume should include the vapor product still left in the railcar following delivery. Farstad
250. See id. at 795-96.
251. See id. at 791-92.
252. See id. at 796.
253. See id. at 796-97 (citing Empresa Constructora Contex Limitada v. Iseki, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026
(S.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that corporate entity that failed to attend arbitration held in Chile could have been
adequately represented by counsel at the proceedings and finding no violation of Article (V)(1)(b)). The district
court distinguished the situation between an arrest warrant that might be pending for David Briggs, and whether
the corporate entity Briggs of Cancun could be entitled to a defense under Article V(1)(b). In addition, the
district court noted that a "fear of arrest or extradition do not constitute an inability to attend an arbitration
hearing." Id. at 797 (citing Nat'l Dev. Co. v. Khashoggi, 781 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
254. P.M.I. Trading Ltd. v. Farstad Oil, 2001 WL 38282 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
255. See 9 U.S.C. § 201.
256. P.M.I. Trading Ltd., 2001 WL 38282 at 1.
257. Id.
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disagreed, contending that only liquid should be included in the calculation. Thus, pursuant
to the parties' contract, the dispute was submitted to arbitration in New York to be governed
by New York law.25 The reviewing arbitration panel ruled in favor of PMI finding that the
term 'volume' as used in the parties' contract included both liquid and vapor.259 PMI then
sought an order from the court confirming the award pursuant to the Convention; Farstad
opposed the petition demanding that the order be vacated because the panel failed to con-
sider the common trade usage of the term volume?.
60
Upon review, the New York district court relied not on the Convention, but on case law
interpreting section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 61 Since the award was ren-
dered in the United States and confirmation and vacatur were sought in the United States,
the court looked to section 10 to resolve the dispute.2 6 Ultimately, the court ruled that
manifest disregard of the law is a judicially created ground for vacating an arbitration
award.26 Although the bounds of this ground have never been defined, it clearly means
more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.164 According to the court,
the error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by
the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.2 65 In this case, the court was unper-
suaded by Farstad's arguments that the parties explicitly contracted for how volume would
be determined. Thus, the customary procedure for such a calculation was deemed irrelevant
and PMI's award was confirmed.26
d. Awards Outside the Scope of Submission
The Convention allows a court to deny a foreign arbitral award if the award deals with
a difference not contemplated or not falling within the terms of the submission to the
arbitration, or if it contains decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission to the
arbitration 6 However, a litigant challenging an arbitration award has a heavy burden when
attempting to prove that an award should not be confirmed on these grounds.
6
This exception was discussed in CBS Corporation v. WAK Orient Power and Light Limited,
where the contractors of a Pakistani company moved to confirm an arbitral award rendered
against the company by a foreign arbitration court.269 The original dispute arose between
WAK Orient Power and Light (WAK) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westing-
house).270 Westinghouse (plaintiff CBS's predecessor in interest) and WAK entered into an
agreement whereby Westinghouse would engineer, design, and construct a barge-mounted









266. See id. at 3.
267. See CBS Corp. v. Wak Orient Power & Light Ltd., 168 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (citing
Convention, art. (V)(l)(c)).
268. See id. at 414-15 (citing Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d
764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992)).
269. See id. at 403.
270. See id. at 406.
271. See id. at 405.
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achieve the level of credit needed for WAK to implement the power supply project, WAK
requested a letter of credit from Westinghouse. Ultimately, the power project did not suc-
ceed because the Pakistani Private Power and Infrastructure Board determined that WAK
had failed to fulfill the letter of credit and terminated their agreement. 2 As a result, several
parties with whom WAK had contracted (including Westinghouse/CBS) filed a request for
arbitration in London with the International Chamber of Commerce's Court of Arbitration
(ICC), claiming that WAK had defaulted on payments that were owed to them. Even though
it was obligated to bring all disputes before the ICC, WAK simultaneously filed a civil suit
in Pakistan claiming that CBS as well as the other subcontractors breached their duty to
provide WAK with the necessary funding for the power supply contract. The Pakistani trial
court found in favor of WAK, but the appellate court overturned the decision because the
lower court erred in dismissing the defendant's defenses.273 Meanwhile, the ICC arbitration
went forward. Ultimately, the ICC ruled against WAK with a finding in favor of CBS.274
CBS then sought to enforce the award in Pennsylvania.
During the U.S. proceedings, WAK opposed the arbitration award arguing that the ICC
did not have jurisdiction to join CBS as a party. In an ICC arbitration, the Terms of Ref-
erence can include a list of issues to be determined.27 In this case, WAK signed the Terms
of Reference, which included a section entitled "The issues to be determined."27 6 This
section expressly stated that one of the issues that may be determined by the arbitral tribunal
was whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the claims that were submitted in the arbi-
tration.2" Despite WAK's arguments to the contrary, the U.S. court found that WAK un-
mistakably agreed to submit to arbitration the question of whether the ICC had jurisdiction
to join CBS as a party to the arbitration proceedings by signing the Terms of Reference.278
The U.S. court concluded that the issues submitted to the arbitrators did not go beyond
the scope of agreement and confirmed the award.279
Similarly, the defendant in Dandong Shuguang Axel Corporation v. Brilliance Machinery
Company, also tried to assert that the plaintiff's arbitration award should not be confirmed
because the issues arbitrated were not contemplated by the parties' original contract.2 80
Plaintiff Dandong Shuguang Axel Corporation (Dandong), a Chinese automobile axle
manufacturing company, entered into a joint venture agreement with Brilliance Machinery
Company (Brilliance) to form a new company. The mission of the new company was to
invest in and operate a gear manufacturing plant in China, from which Dandong would
purchase gears. The agreement provided that any contract disputes would be governed by
Chinese law and provided that all disputes "occurring in carrying out or concerned with"
the joint venture agreement would be submitted to arbitration by the China International
Committee of Economic-Trade Arbitration (CICETA).81 The underlying dispute arose
when Dandong, after paying the $100,000 down payment and paying for 49 percent of the
272. See id. at 406-07.
273. See id at 409.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 412.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 414.
280. Dandong Shuguang Axel Corporation v. Brilliance Machinery Co., 2001 WL 637446, 4 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
281. Id. at 1.
SUMMER 2002
458 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
needed equipment, could not open the requisite letter of credit. Dandong claimed that it
could not open the letter of credit because Brilliance changed the directions for opening
the letter and because of a banking holiday. Brilliance asserted that Dandong's letters of
credit were inadequate and refused to ship any of the equipment to Dandong. Thus, Dan-
dong took the matter before the CICETA, which determined that the letters of credit were
sufficient and that Brilliance had breached the agreement by failing to ship the equipment. 82
Dandong then sought to confirm the order in California.
In response to Dandong's motion for summary judgment confirming the arbitration
order, Brilliance argued that the CICETA decision was outside the scope of issues appro-
priate for arbitration because the dispute arose out of a separate and distinct contract which
did not include an arbitration clause. The district court was unpersuaded, particularly be-
cause the parties' original joint agreement contemplated latter agreements." 3 The court
held that ancillary contracts that do not contain separate arbitration provisions generally
fall within the scope of an arbitration clause in a more general contract.28 4 Therefore,
because Brilliance was unable to meet its burden of proof establishing that the arbitration
award was outside the scope of the joint venture agreement, Dandong was entitled to sum-
mary judgment."'
e. Enforcement of Awards Contrary to Public Policy
Another exception to the law requiring that U.S. courts confirm foreign arbitral awards
falling under the Convention exists when confirming the award would contradict U.S.
public policy.216 This exception is very narrow.28' Courts have held that the exception is
only applied when enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of mo-
rality and justice.288
In addition to their arguments concerning the scope of submission, defendants in CBS
v. WAK Orient Power and Light Ltd. also argued that the U.S. court should not approve the
arbitration award against them because to do so would be contrary to the public policy of
the United States.28 9 WAK claimed that public policy would be violated because the decision
of the Pakistani trial court as to arbitrability should be granted comity. The U.S. district
court disagreed, finding that WAK incorrectly argued the decision of the Pakistani appellate
court.29° The U.S. court determined that the appellate court in Pakistan ruled that CBS
was never given the opportunity to argue that the claims were arbitrable because the trial
court incorrectly struck CBS's defenses.291 Therefore, the Pakistani appellate court re-
manded the case and at the time of the U.S. proceedings there had been no valid decision
by a Pakistani court which could be said to be entitled to recognition as a matter of comity
or as a matter of law.292 Given that WAK did not prove that confirming the award would
282. See id.
283. See id. at 4.
284. See id. (citingJJ. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulec Textile, 863 F.2d 315, 318-20 (4th Cir. 1988)).
285. See id. at 5.
286. Convention, art. V(2)(b). See also CBS Corp. v. WAK Orient Power and Light Ltd., 168 F. Supp. 2d
403 (E.D. Penn. 2001).
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing Parsons & Whittenore Overseas Co. v. RAKTA, 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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violate the basic U.S. notions of morality and justice, the court was required to confirm the
arbitration award2 9
3
Likewise, the court in Dandong ShuguangAxel Corporation v. Brilliance Machinery Company
also found the public policy exception inapplicable to the arbitration award.294 Brilliance
argued that enforcing the arbitration award would contradict U.S. public policy because
the award was based on false statements that Dandong made to the arbitration panel, and
that the enforcement of the monetary penalty ($100,000) was punitive in nature.2 9 Under
Chapter 1 of the FAA, arbitration awards based on corruption, fraud, or undue means may
be vacated by a reviewing court.296 However, the district court here found that Brilliance
failed to set forth specific facts supporting its allegation that Dandong made false statements
in the arbitration hearing. The court was also unpersuaded by Brilliance's argument that
the monetary penalty was punitive in nature.297 Brilliance relied on Garrity v. Lyle Smart
Inc.,2 9s for the proposition that punitive damages in arbitration are against public policy.
However, the court discounted this argument on several grounds. The court stated that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law so that when the arbitration rules allow punitive
damages, a state law or policy against them will not preclude enforcement99 Additionally,
federal courts have upheld punitive damages awarded in arbitration. °° Therefore, the court
was obligated to confirm the foreign arbitration award favoring Dandong. °10
B. CASES CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
The party asserting that a foreign judgment should be recognized in a U.S. court has the
burden of proof. 0 2 Following the principles set forth in Hilton v. Guyot, °3 a foreign judg-
ment should be recognized if the foreign forum (1) allowed for a court of competent juris-
diction to give a full and fair trial on the issues presented, (2) ensured that justice was
impartially administered, (3) ensured that the trial was free of fraud or prejudice, (4) had
proper jurisdiction over the parties, and (4) the judgment of the foreign forum did not
violate public policy.04
1. Preclusive Effect of Foreign Judgments
a. Res Judicata
In Black Clawson Company v. Kroenert Corporation, a licensee with exclusive rights to a
licensor's technology brought an unfair competition suit in the United States against a
German equipment manufacturer.1°s Plaintiff, Black Clawson, was an Ohio corporation who
293. See id.
294. Dandong Shuguang Axel Corp., 2001 WL 637446 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
295. See id.
296. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
297. Dandong, 2001 WL 637446 at 6.
298. Garrity v. Lyle Smart, Inc., 40 N.Y. 2d 354 (1976).
299. Dandong, 2001 WL 637446 at 6 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995)).
300. See id. (citing Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys. Inc., 1989 WL 32149 (D. Mass. 1989); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820,
822-24 (9th Cir. 1997)).
301. Dandong, 2001 WL 637446 at 6.
302. Shen v. Leo A. Daly Co., 222 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2000).
303. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
304. Shen, 222 F.3d at 476.
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licensed certain intellectual property owned by Pagendarm, a German corporation. The
agreement was an exclusive licensing agreement whereby Black Clawson had the exclusive
right to use Pagendarm's proprietary information in its manufacturing business in North
America. Prior to executing this agreement, however, certain former Pagendarm employees
stole the licensed technology and created two companies, one in Germany, and one in the
United States under the names of Maschinenfabrik Max Kroenert GmbH (MMK) and
Kroenert Corporation (Kroenert), respectively. Kroenert Corporation, a Delaware corpo-
ration, manufactured products in direct competition with the technology licensed by Black
Clawson. As a result, Black Clawson filed suit against Kroenert alleging unfair competition
and violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
Similarly, a German corporation, Pagendarm BTT (BTT) licensed the same technology as
Black Clawson but for use exclusively within Europe. As such, BTT also brought suit against
Kroenert's German parent, MMK, for misappropriation and improper use of the technol-
ogy in Europe. Ultimately, Pagendarm and BTT entered into a settlement agreement with
MMK resolving and dismissing the German litigation with prejudice .106 The German de-
fendants attempted to induce Black Clawson to intervene in the German case and dismiss
the American litigation. Black Clawson refused and did not participate in the German
proceedings. Kroenert then made a motion for summary judgment arguing that the prin-
ciple of resjudicata prohibited Black Clawson from seeking relief in the United States be-
cause the German settlement agreement released Kroenert of any further liability arising
out of the defendant's use of the technology at issue.307 The district court agreed finding
that the settlement agreement precluded Black Clawson's claims.308
On review, however, the Eight Circuit reversed on the grounds that although Pagendarm
and Black Clawson had a close business relationship, their interests were not identical.1°9
The reviewing court reiterated the rule that the party against whom resjudicata is asserted
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the proceeding that is to
be given preclusive effect.?" The party is not, however, required to intervene voluntarily
in a separate pending suit merely because it is permissible to do so.3 ' Thus, because Pa-
gendarm assigned its rights in the United States, the only party who would be harmed by
defendants' improper importation and use of the technology in the United States was Black
Clawson.' The acts committed by defendants occurred in the United States during the
effective period of the license and caused injury to Black Clawson. 3 Black Clawson had
standing as an assignee to bring its own claims against the defendants independent of Pa-
gendarm.3 4 Thus, Pagendarm could not release defendants from claims or causes of action
to which it was not entitled."' Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's
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b. Collateral Estoppel
In addition to resjudicata, the principle of collateral estoppel may also be used to enforce
or preclude foreign judgments in the United States. In Pony Express Records v. Bruce Spr-
ingsteen, the defendant, a popular recording artist, sought to estop plaintiffs from asserting
claims of copyright infringement where the issue had already been litigated in the United
Kingdom."' Originally, Springsteen brought suit in the United Kingdom against a distrib-
uting company called Masquerade Music Limited for unauthorized distributions of Spr-
ingsteen's music compositions and sound recordings.' Masquerade's defense to the suit
was that it had the right to exploit the compositions pursuant to a purported license from
Pony Express and JEC. The British High Court held in favor of Springsteen, finding that
the rights to the artist's songs did not transfer from the original contracting party (Sioux
City Limited) to Pony Express and/or JEC 1'9 Therefore, the rights could not be licensed
further to Masquerade.
Despite the decision of the High Court, plaintiff, Pony Express, filed a complaint against
Springsteen in the U.S. District Court in New Jersey alleging copyright infringement,
conversion, breach of contract, unfair competition, and civil conspiracy. Springsteen coun-
terclaimed on similar grounds. Springsteen also moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the U.K. judgment estopped Pony Express from litigating the critical issue of
copyright ownership. The trial court took a two-pronged approach to determine
(1) whether plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation and
(2) if so, that the issues litigated in the U.K. were identical to those presented in the United
States.3 20
During trial, plaintiffs argued that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to par-
ticipate in the U.K. litigation because Masquerade prevented them from doing so. The
court, however, disagreed finding that even though the parties were not in privity with one
another, the original license which plaintiffs granted to Masquerade provided the plaintiffs
with the opportunity to participate in the U.K. proceedings."' Simply because Masquerade
did not let plaintiffs join in their suit, does not mean that plaintiffs were without recourse.322
Since plaintiffs made no effort to enforce their legal right to participate in the U.K. liti-
gation, the U.S. court could not conclude that plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to
exercise that right.32 3 Secondly, the court also found that the issues presented to the High
Court were identical to those being litigated in the United States.324 Accepting the High
Court's determination that Springsteen's copyrights were transferred to Sioux Limited (and
not to Pony Express), the court was precluded from deciding in favor of plaintiffs.325
c. Conflict of Law
U.S. courts generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees unless enforcement would
be prejudicial or contrary to the country's interests. 326 For example, in Yahoo! Inc., v. La
317. Pony Express Records v. Bruce Springteen, 163 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D.NJ. 2001).
318. See id. at 469.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 475-76.
321. See id. at 475.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 476.
325. See id.
326. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (citing Somportex Ltd., v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)).
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Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, plaintiff Yahoo!, was able to obtain a declaratory
judgment against a French citizens' group where the enforcement of the French judgment
in the United States would have violated Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights. 27 The issue
presented to the court was whether it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States for another nation to regulate speech by a U.S. resident within the United
States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet users in that nation.2 , The
U.S. district court held that the French order's content and viewpoint-based regulation of
the web pages and auction site on Yahoo.com, while entitled to great deference as an ar-
ticulation of French law, would clearly be inconsistent with the First Amendment if man-
dated by a court in the United States.329 According to the court, absent a body of law
establishing international standards with respect to speech on the Internet or an appropriate
treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech originating within
the United States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the court's obligation to uphold
the First Amendment.33 °
In another case involving a French court order, a U.S. district court did grant comity to
a French decision concerning certain patent ownership rights."3' In International Nutrition
Company v. Horphag Research Ltd., the issue was whether or not a patent assignee, Inter-
national Nutrition Company (INC) could litigate patent ownership rights in the United
States which had already been determined by a French court.3 2 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court's grant of comity and summary judgment favoring
defendants, Horphag Research (Horphag), was not an abuse of discretion." The Federal
Circuit was not persuaded by INC's argument that the ownership of a U.S. patent was a
matter of U.S. patent law and that granting comity based on a determination of ownership
under French law would be contrary to U.S. patent law.34 Rather, the court found that
comity was appropriate because the French courts had determined who owned a U.S. patent
pursuant to a French contract.333 Contrary to INC's position, the question of who owns
patent rights, and on what terms, is typically a question for state courts and not one arising
under U.S. patent laws.336 Therefore, because the parties had an agreement to apply French
law as to patent ownership disputes, the contract law issue was properly resolved by the
French court and there was no conflict between the foreign decision and U.S. patent law." 7
2. Foreign Money Judgment Act
In Dresdner Bank AG v. Imhad Haque,3 s Dresdner Bank (Dresdner) brought an action in
a New York district court against Imhad Haque (Haque) to enforce a money judgment
327. Id. For a discussion of the Yahoo! Litigation see supra Teitz, Parallel Prceedings-Siyphean Progress, at
text accompanying notes 7-21.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 1192.
330. See id. at 1193.
331. Int'l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
332. See id. at 1328.
333. Seeid. at 1131.
334. See id. at 1329.
335. See id.
336. See id. (citingJim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys. Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
337. Int'lNutrition Co., 257 F.3d at 1130.
338. Dresdner Bank Ag v. Imbad Hague, 161 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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awarded by a German court. The German judgment was the result of a suit brought by
Dresdner against Haque to enforce Haque's personal guaranty of the obligations of a Ger-
man corporate entity. The case was tried before a three-judge panel in Germany, which
found in favor of Dresdner, awarding the plaintiff three million Deutsche Marks in damages,
plus interest. Dresdner then sought to enforce the money judgment against Haque in the
United States. Applying New York law, the district court found that the judgment was fully
enforceable in the United States as prescribed by Article 53 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (CPLR) and New York common law.5 9 Under Article 53 of the CPLR, a
foreign country judgment must be recognized unless (1) the judgment was rendered under
a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law, or (2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. 40 As such, the court granted plaintiff Dresdner's motion for sum-
mary judgment finding that Germany has impartial tribunals and procedures compatible
with due process and the German court had personal jurisdiction over defendant.141
VII. Act of State
KRISTEN BooN*
The act of state doctrine serves as grounds for abstention where U.S. courts are called
to assess the validity of an official act of a foreign state. Although frequently raised by states
as a defense, the doctrine is in fact rarely applied. Furthermore, although originally devel-
oped to balance the power of courts with the prerogatives of diplomacy, the doctrine has
been narrowed in recent years, suggesting that domestic courts are increasingly serving as
the final arbiters in private disputes with foreign states.
A. U.S. COURTS CANNOT ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF FOREIGN STATE ACTS
The Supreme Court's decision in WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Techtonics
Corp.,342 set out the parameters of the modem act of state doctrine: domestic courts are
barred from considering cases involving foreign states where resolution of those claims turn
on the legality or illegality of official actions by foreign sovereigns on their own territory.
A straightforward application of this doctrine recently arose in World Wide Minerals Ltd. v.
The Republic ofKazakhstahn, 43 where the D.C. district court declined to consider claims
against Kazakhstahn that would require a determination of the validity of official acts. The
case involved a contract dispute between a Canadian company, World Wide Minerals, and
the government of Kazakhstahn for the mining and exporting of uranium. In 1996 and
1997, World Wide entered a number of agreements with Kazakhstahn relating to the man-
agement of a northern mines complex in Kazakhstahn. World Wide was never able to sell
the uranium from the mines however, since Kazakhstahn later determined it could not
provide an export license due to a prior confidential agreement with an American company
339. See id.
340. See id. at 262.
341. See id. at 263.
*Kristen Boon is Clerk to Justice William Ian Corneil Binnie, Supreme Court of Canada.
342. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envronmental Techtonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
343. World Wide Minerals Ltd. v. The Repubic of Kazakhstahn, 116 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2000).
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for the exclusive marketing of the uranium. In response to World Wide's suit, Kazakhstahn
raised the act of state doctrine as a defense. The district court upheld the defense, stating
that under the test set out in Kirkpatrick, no relief was available to World Wide. The court
reasoned that it could not assess the legality of Kazakhstahn's denial of the export license
when to do so would require an assessment of the validity of regulations enacted for national
and international security which are matters of foreign sovereign activity. 44
B. SUBSEQUENT GOVERNMENTS AND TERRORIST STATES NOT PROTECTED
Recent decisions also suggest that the underlying policy of the act of state doctrine, that
the political branches of government should reign in the realm of foreign affairs, is increas-
ingly being assessed against the likely impact on international relations. Thus, where "ad-
judication would embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign relations, the
court should refrain from inquiring into the validity of the foreign state's acts. 34 A number
of courts have recently decided not to abstain on act of state grounds where the incident
giving rise to the claim occurred under former regimes.3" In a similar vein, the District
Court of Columbia declined to uphold Iraq's act of state defense in a case alleging official
torture of several U.S. citizens in Iraq, on the grounds that the policy underlying the act
of state doctrine does not deter a court from considering a case against a nation designated
as a terrorist state.
3 47
344. See id. at 104 (citing Mol. Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 85 (D. Or. 1983)).
345. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F. 3d 440, 452 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Republic of Phillipinesv. Marcos,
806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986).
346. See id. (alleged expropriation under Nasser regime in Egypt will not embarrass current government
which repudiated the act); Bodner v. Banqu Paribas et al., 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (official acts
of Vichy Regime have been rejected by subsequent French governments).
347. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (D.C.C. 2000) ("for this court to grant defen-
dant's motion to dismiss on act of state grounds would constitute more of a judicial interference in the an-
nounced foreign policy of the political branches of government than to allow the suit to proceed under the
explicit authorization of Congress").
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